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#### Shut down nearly decimated investor confidence in Mexican export industry—

Paterson 10-11-13 Kent Paterson, Frontera NorteSur // October 11, 2013 // Business & Technology “U.S. crisis unsettles Mexico” [http://newspapertree.com/articles/2013/10/11/us-crisis-unsettles-mexico] [MG]

The partial shutdown of the U.S. government is unsettling the Mexican economy. As the crisis took shape last week, the Mexican peso dipped to 13.34 units per dollar, an amount which represented the second largest depreciation in 2013. The pending October 17 showdown over the U.S. debt limit is likewise contributing to the jitters, said Gabriela Siller, an analyst for Mexico-based Banco Base. In the Mexico-U.S. border region, Mexican business leaders expressed worry that the political gridlock on the Potomac could deepen and trigger devastating consequences on the assembly-for-export, or maquiladora, industry. In Ciudad Juarez and other border cities, the foreign-owned maquiladora sector constitutes a dominant or major part of the economy. Longer export times, reduced market demand and idled assembly lines are among the concerns voiced by Ciudad Juarez business representatives. “The economy is flowing at the moment, but we don’t know how it is going to behave at the end of the year,” said Rodolfo Martinez Garza, president of the Association of Customs Agents in Ciudad Juarez. Martinez added that the last quarter of the year is the biggest season of import-export activity, and that unstable economic circumstances could result in stagnation. “There is a lot of uncertainty for investment and this is very negative for Ciudad Juarez,” Martinez said. According to Mexico’s National Council of the Maquiladora Industry and Export Manufacturing, any effects of the U.S. shutdown should be measurable in industrial production after October 20. Thomas Fullerton, economist for the University of Texas at El Paso, said the impacts of the U.S. government shutdown on the maquildora industry – which also supports thousands of jobs in his city – could be worse than the previous one in 1995-96 because of the still-incomplete recovery from the 2008 economic crash. The U.S. crisis comes at a time when worries already exist over the state of the Mexican economy and the tax reform looming in the Mexican Congress, including a possible hike in the border region sales tax from its current 11 percent to 16 percent. In Ciudad Juarez, many business, community and political leaders oppose the sales tax hike and warn of an outflow of pesos to neighboring Texas and New Mexico, where sales taxes are much lower, if the Mexican Congress increases the tax this fall under the proposal advanced by the Pena Nieto administration. This week, a coalition of popular organizations, tire and used car industry groups delivered at petition with 12,733 signatures against the sales tax hike to Congresswoman Martha Beatriz Cordoba. A member of the Citizen Movement party, Corboba has emerged as a leader against a higher tax. The political turmoil and debates in both Washington and Mexico City occur at a moment when indicators reveal some adverse trends in the Mexican economy. On October 8, the International Monetary Fund projected that Mexico’s 2013 growth rate would be a mere 1.2 percent – far less than the growth in the 3 percent range widely predicted earlier in the year. In the Latin American and Caribbean group of nations, Mexico’s growth performance puts it in the same general camp this year as Brazil, Venezuela and Jamaica. Agustin de la Torre, chief economist for the World Bank, was surprised by the weak Mexican growth report. “We do not have an easy explanation on why Mexico did not recuperate,” de la Torre said. “Without a doubt, there is an enormous contrast between the perception that investors have of Mexico in light of structural reforms on the one hand and the low growth this year on the other.”

#### Neito tax reform uniquely places sustainability at risk—

Replogle 9-20-13 Jill Replogle, Fronteras Reporter, KPBS “Mexico Fiscal Reform Could Be Bad For Maquiladoras” [<http://www.kpbs.org/news/2013/sep/20/mexico-fiscal-reform-could-be-bad-maquiladoras/>] [MG]

The maquiladora export industry that’s a key component of the U.S.-Mexico border economy could face major changes under proposed reforms to Mexico’s tax system. Mexico currently collects fewer taxes from its citizens and companies than almost any other developed country. Mexico relies heavily on revenues from its state-run oil industry, which is in decline. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto wants to change this. One way he wants to do it is by tightening control over the country’s vast maquiladora export industry. Factories that make and export goods to the U.S. and other foreign markets currently don’t pay taxes on their raw materials and machinery. But that would change under the proposed reform. Maquiladoras would have to pay the normal 16 percent sales tax on their raw materials and then request a refund of that money when they export the final product. That would require exporters to invest a lot more cash up front, said Héctor Vega, a tax partner with Deloitte Mexico. It could erase some of the advantage Mexico has over its manufacturing competitors, Vega said. “Because we are very close to the U.S., it’s very natural doing business,” he said. “However, this 16 percent will impact a lot and maybe determinate where you put your investment, either in China, either in Vietnam, either in Malaysia or keep it in Mexico.” Still, Vega is hopeful that the tax change affecting maquiladoras will ultimately be stripped from the final fiscal reform bill.

#### Collapse threatens national security—altering engagement policy is critical to sustain it

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011 [MG]

The Mexican maquiladora industry is rapidly losing market share to Asian competitors that dramatically undercut them in terms of labor cost. The decline of these assembly-for-export factories will result in instability along the U.S.-Mexico border and will prove to be a serious national security issue for the United States. This paper leverages Design theory to frame the problems surrounding Mexico’s maquiladora industry in order to develop an understanding of this complex adaptive system. It examines the wide range of actors involved in the system, focusing on their goals, motivations and conflicting tendencies. Finally, the paper recommends courses of action for U.S. and Mexican leaders that will mitigate the resulting instability in the Mexican northern border states. The economic stability of Mexico will always be a national security priority for the United States. The two nations share a border of nearly 2,000 miles, and trade between them is worth billions of dollars. To take advantage of this relationship, the Mexican government created a series of customs and trade policies specifically designed to enhance its economic ties to the U.S. For decades, such policies greatly benefited Mexico’s maquiladoras, factories that import raw materials, rapidly combine them into finished products, and export them to the American market. Unfortunately for Mexico, the strong advantages in low-cost labor and speedy delivery are gradually being eroded by similar programs in China and Southeast Asia. As U.S. companies look to Asia for more profitable business relationships, the Mexican government has done little to alter its customs and trade policies in response. A severe economic blow to the maquiladoras along the U.S. border would have dramatic effects on the stability of the area, affecting both Mexican and American national security interests. The governments of Mexico and the United States should therefore take preemptive measures to mitigate the instability that is arising as the maquiladoras lose their viability under new global economic pressures. These measures include altering customs and trade policies, providing economic incentives in order to transform the Mexican export industry, and creating labor opportunities for Mexicans within the United States. In order to support this thesis, the following paper will leverage Design Theory to examine the current situation in the Mexican maquiladora industry, identify problems in terms of potential impacts to U.S. national security, and propose possible courses of action for both American and Mexican decision-makers.

#### This threatens the entire relationship and causes industries to shift toward China—

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011

The Problem Frame highlights the issues that must be addressed in order to transform current conditions into the desired end state.25 In this case, the desired end state is a more stable economy in the northern Mexican states, free from the current stress brought about by the decline in the maquiladora industry. Since 60% of Mexican maquiladoras operate in the border states, this end state is a key factor in the stability of the border area for both the United States and Mexico.26 Additionally, 80% of all Mexican exports are to the United States, making this relationship extremely important.27 It is in the best interest of these nations to take action to reach this end state. In order to develop future courses of action that create conditions conducive for the desired end state, the current challenges that currently exist in this system must be examined. The three major challenges to reaching the desired end state are connected to flaws in the Mexican export industry, specifically its inability to respond to global competition, its overreliance on the American market, and its lack of complexity. A fourth challenge is connected to the free flow of labor in this region. These challenges are obstacles in the path to a stable and secure northern Mexico. First of all, Mexico’s response to increased competition for its maquiladoras has been completely inadequate. Over the past decade, China has presented an attractive alternative to Mexican maquiladoras in terms of labor costs. In 2008, Chinese hourly manufacturing wages were estimated nearly 75% cheaper than those in Mexico.28 For over a decade, Chinese factories have been able to assemble goods of equal quality as the maquiladoras, but now they can provide greater quality control and better physical infrastructure.29 As drug violence continues in Mexico, security has become a greater decision point for businesses as well, and many are concerned that investing in Mexico is a risk.30 Mexico’s two main responses to this situation have been extremely inadequate and have not improved the overall situation. The Mexican government’s first response was to escalate anti-Chinese rhetoric, even working to delay China’s entry into the World Trade Organization.31 This merely delayed the inevitable and resolved nothing. Later, driven by the need to compete with China, Mexican factories laid off personnel and cut worker salaries in order to reduce labor costs.32 Considering the weak global economy, this unfortunate move added pressure to an already-stressed workforce. The resultant increases in unemployment and underemployment, combined with reduced salaries, will increase instability in the region as people are driven to crime, either as victims or participants.33

#### US reliance on Chinese technology for military purposes undermines its capability and allows for Chinese espionage

Snyder 5/29/13 – (Michael, “Why The Next War With China Could Go Very Badly For The United States”, http://www.infowars.com/why-the-next-war-with-china-could-go-very-badly-for-the-united-states/)//javi

Another way that China is gaining a strategic advantage over the U.S. is by getting the U.S. military to become increasingly dependent upon them. According to Forbes, now the U.S. military is even leasing a Chinese satellite for communications purposes… American dependence on China grows by the day. The latestnews is that the United States has been reduced to leasing a Chinese satellite to handle communications with U.S. military bases in Africa. Surprising, isn’t it? The nation that launched the world’s first communications satellite (I remember it well – it was called Telstar) has so lost its manufacturing mojo that it has to rely on its most formidable military adversary to provide the hardware for some of its most sensitive communications. This at a time when underlying unemployment rates among U.S. manufacturing workers remain at near-depression levels. Isn’t that crazy? And a recent Senate report discovered that many of our most advanced weapons systems are absolutely riddled with counterfeit Chinese parts… A recent Senate report, titled Inquiry Into Counterfeit Electronic Parts In The Department Of Defense Supply Chain, “uncovered overwhelming evidence of large numbers of counterfeit parts making their way into critical defense systems.” The investigation found 1,800 cases of counterfeit electronic parts involving over one million suspect parts in 2009-10 alone, thereby exposing “a defense supply chain that relies on hundreds of unveiled independent distributors to supply electronic parts for some of our most sensitive systems.” The report concluded, among other things, that China is the “dominant source” of counterfeit products that enter the DoD supply chain, that the Chinese government does little to stop it and that the DoD doesn’t know the “scope and impact” of these parts on critical defense systems. Who in the world would be stupid enough to allow one of their greatest strategic enemies to supply large numbers of parts for key weapons systems? Apparently we are that stupid. Things are particularly bad when it comes to semiconductors… Senator John McCain commented: “We can’t tolerate the risk of a ballistic missile interceptor failing to hit its target, a helicopter pilot unable to fire his missiles, or any other mission failure because of a counterfeit part.” Calling the issue “a ticking time bomb,” Brian Toohey, president of the Semiconductor Industry Association, commented: “The catastrophic failure risk inherently found in counterfeit semiconductors places our citizens and military personnel in unreasonable peril.” It would be bad enough if we just had to worry about counterfeit parts failing. But what if China has a way to shut some of those parts down in the event of a conflict? What if some of those parts contain “Trojan Horse” computer chips or malware? That may sound crazy, but unfortunately Trojan Horse chips can be extremely difficult to detect. The following is from a recent Forbes article… As the Defense Science Board pointed out, Trojan Horse circuitry is almost impossible to detect even with the most rigorous analysis. This is particularly so if a saboteur can accomplish matching subversions in both software and relevant hardware.

#### Chinese espionage is the biggest internal link to Chinese military modernization

U.S.-China ESRC 7 – U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission[Report to Congress-The Commission was made up of members of the 110th Congress, 1st Session, November, <http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2007/report_to_congress.pdf>The pace and success of China’s military modernization continue to exceed U.S. government estimates**.** Indeed, on occasion the U.S. defense and intelligence communities have been taken by surprise, 7 as in the case of the launching of the Jin class submarine by the navy of the People’s Liberation Army. China’s defense industry is producing new generations of weapon platforms with impressive speed and quality, and these advancements are duein partto the highly effective manner in which Chinese defense companies are integrating commercial technologies into military systems. Additionally, industrial espionage provides Chinese companies an added source of new technology without the necessity of investing time or money to perform research. Chinese espionage in the United States, which now comprises the single greatest threat to U.S. technology, is straining the U.S. counterintelligence establishment. This illicit activity significantly contributes to China’s military modernization and acquisition of new capabilities.

#### US can no longer win the war due to Chinese tech advancement through espionage

Snyder 5/29/13 – (Michael, “Why The Next War With China Could Go Very Badly For The United States”, http://www.infowars.com/why-the-next-war-with-china-could-go-very-badly-for-the-united-states/)//javi

Most Americans assume that the U.S. military is so vastly superior to everyone else that no other nation would ever dream of fighting a full-scale war against us. Unfortunately, that assumption is dead wrong. In recent years, the once mammoth technological gap between the U.S. military and the Chinese military has been closing at a frightening pace. China has been accomplishing this by brazenly stealing our technology and hacking into our computer systems. The Pentagon and the Obama administration know all about this, but they don’t do anything about it. Perhaps the fact that China owns about a trillion dollars of our national debt has something to do with that. In any event, today China has the largest military in the world and the second largest military budget in the world. They have stolen plans for our most advanced jets, helicopters, ships and missile systems. It is estimated that stealing our technology has saved China about 25 years of research and development. In addition, China is rapidly developing a new generation of strategic weapons that could potentially enable it to actually win a future war against the United States. At one time such a notion would have been unthinkable, but as you will see below, the next war with China could go very badly for the United States.

#### Chinese military modernization causes nuclear war

Twomey 9, co-directs the Center for Contemporary Conflict and is an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, both @ the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, 9 [Christopher, Arms Control Association, “Chinese-U.S. Strategic Affairs: Dangerous Dynamism, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009\_01-02/china\_us\_dangerous\_dynamism#Twomey]

China and the United States are not in a strategic weapons arms race. Nonetheless, their modernization and sizing decisions increasingly are framed with the other in mind. Nuclear weapons are at the core of this interlocking pattern of development. In particular, China is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council expanding its arsenal; it is also enhancing its arsenal. The basic facts of Chinese strategic modernization are well known, if the details remain frustratingly opaque. China is deploying road-mobile, solid-fueled missiles, giving it a heighted degree of security in its second-strike capability. It is beginning to deploy ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). It is researching a wide range of warhead and delivery systems technologies that will lead to increased accuracy and, more pointedly, increased penetration against ballistic missile defenses. The size of China's deliverable arsenal against the United States will undoubtedly increase beyond the few dozen that it possessed recently.[1] The pace of growth thus far has been moderate, although China has only recently developed reliable, survivable delivery systems. The final endpoint remains mired in opacity and uncertainty, although several score of deliverable warheads seems likely for the near term. These developments on the strategic side are coupled with elements of conventional modernization that impinge on the strategic balance.[2] The relevant issue, however, is not simply an evaluation of the Chinese modernization program, but rather an evaluation of the interaction of that modernization with U.S. capabilities and interests. U.S. capabilities are also changing. Under the provisions of START and SORT, the United States has continued to engage in quantitative reductions of its operational nuclear arsenal. At the same, there is ongoing updating of warhead guidance and fusing systems. Ballistic missile defense systems of a variety of footprints are being deployed. The U.S. SSBN force now leans more toward the Pacific than the Atlantic, reversing the Cold War deployment. Guam's capacity to support heavy bombers and attack submarines has been enhanced. Furthermore, advances in U.S. conventional weaponry have been so substantial that they too promise strategic effects: prompt global strike holds out the promise of a U.S. weapon on target anywhere in the world in less than an hour and B-2s with highly accurate weapons can sustain strategic effects over a campaign. What are the concerns posed by these two programs of dynamic strategic arsenals? Most centrally, the development of the strategic forces detailed above has increasingly assumed an interlocked form. The U.S. revolution in precision guided munitions was followed by an emphasis on mobility in the Chinese missile force. U.S. missile defense systems have clearly spurred an emphasis on countermeasures in China's ICBM force and quantitative buildups in its regional missile arsenals.[3] Beijing's new submarine-based forces further enhance the security of China's second-strike capability in the face of a potential U.S. strike but are likely to lead to increased attention to anti-submarine warfare in the United States. China's recent anti-satellite test provoked a U.S. demonstration of similar capabilities. Such reciprocal responses have the potential to move toward a tightly coupled arms race and certainly have already worsened threat perceptions on each side. The potential for conflict is not simply that of inadvertent escalation; there are conflicts of interests between the two. Heightening threat perceptions in that context greatly complicates diplomacy. Further, the dangers of inadvertent escalation have been exacerbated by some of these moves. Chinese SSBN deployment will stress an untested command-and-control system. Similar dangers in the Cold War were mitigated, although not entirely overcome, over a period of decades of development of personnel and technical solutions. China appears to have few such controls in place today. U.S. deployment of highly accurate nuclear warheads is consistent with a first-strike doctrine and seems sized for threats larger than "rogue" nations. These too would undermine stability in an intense crisis.

### 1ac – plan

#### The United States federal government ought to offer financial assistance toward the assembly-for-export industry in Mexico.

### 1ac – manufacturing

#### Foreign investment is key to evolve factories technologically—

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011

A third challenge associated with this system concerns the lack of complexity of the production performed by the maquiladoras. The vast majority of maquiladoras conduct simple assembly, so the factories involved are tooled for basic production, and the employees only have basic skills. This drastically limits the ability of both the factories and their employees to adjust to new forms of production as the maquiladoras fall to foreign competitors. This industry is so tightly tied to specific customers in the U.S. that a transition to some other form of production would require massive changes in structure and labor. The Mexican government understands this as a problem and seeks to drive the evolution of so-called “first generation” maquiladoras to second and third generation models. The first generation maquiladoras are the least complex and simply assemble raw materials. Foreign investment brings with it technology, and, with this technology, the maquiladoras evolve into more complex factories that eventually focus less on labor intensity and more on more sophisticated products, R&D and even product design.39 Unfortunately, there are few examples of this trend, and many critics complain that the entire concept of the maquiladora “traps developing countries into the deadend role of providing cheap labor for low value-added assembly operations.”40

#### US financial assistance is key for manufacturing

Villarreal 8/9/12 – (M. Angeles, “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications”, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf)//javi

Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an integral part of the economic relationship between the United States and Mexico since NAFTA implementation. FDI consists of investments in real estate, manufacturing plants, and retail facilities, in which the foreign investor owns 10% or more of the entity. The United States is the largest source of FDI in Mexico. The stock of U.S. FDI increased from $17.0 billion in 1994 to $91.4 billion in 2011, a 440% increase (see Table 4). Mexican FDI in the United States is much lower than U.S. investment in Mexico, with levels of Mexican FDI fluctuating over the last 10 years. In 2010, Mexican FDI in the United States totaled $12.6 billion (see Table 4). The sharp rise in U.S. investment in Mexico since NAFTA is also a result of the liberalization of Mexico’s restrictions on foreign investment in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Prior to the mid-1980s, Mexico had a very protective policy that restricted foreign investment and controlled the exchange rate to encourage domestic growth, affecting the entire industrial sector. Mexico’s trade liberalization measures and economic reform in the late 1980s represented a sharp shift in policy and helped bring in a steady increase of FDI flows into Mexico. NAFTA provisions on foreign investment helped to lock in the reforms and increase investor confidence. Under NAFTA, Mexico gave U.S. and Canadian investors nondiscriminatory treatment of their investments as well as investor protection. NAFTA may have encouraged U.S. FDI in Mexico by increasing investor confidence, but much of the growth may have occurred anyway because Mexico likely would have continued to liberalize its foreign investment laws with or without the agreement. Nearly half of total FDI investment in Mexico is in the manufacturing industry, of which the maquiladora industry forms a major part. (See “Mexico’s Export-Oriented Assembly Plants” below.) In Mexico, the industry has helped attract investment from countries such as the United States that have a relatively large amount of capital. For the United States, the industry is important because U.S. companies are able to locate their labor-intensive operations in Mexico and lower their labor costs in the overall production process.

#### Investment is critical for relations —Key to solve border security, trafficking, and the economy

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011 [MG]

The relevant policy drivers for the United States government are preserving stability along its border, curbing illegal immigration, maintaining a strong domestic economy, and building productive relationships with Mexico.20 It should be immediately noted that these goals can come into conflict with one another. For example, although maintaining a thriving economy entails ensuring that U.S. businesses have the opportunity to engage in deals that are the most lucrative, abandoning current relationships with Mexican factories could negatively affect relations between the two countries. Current initiatives to secure the Southern border and curb illegal immigration might also affect how the U.S. interacts with Mexico in the economic or anti-drug arenas. Mexico’s goals are extremely similar to those of the United States. Security and stability along its border, a strong domestic economy, and building strong relations with the U.S. are all high priorities for the Mexican government. Illegal immigration, although a contentious issue for the United States, is not bothersome for Mexico.21 Although nearly identical on the surface, the Mexican goals involve different priorities than those of the U.S. For example, a strong domestic economy for Mexico means a continuance of the large amount of remittances from Mexicans in the United States.22 It also concerns focusing its industry on the production of goods for domestic consumption and focusing on high-tech indigenous models.23 For Mexico, “building strong relations” with the United States involves the receipt of assistance, whereas for the U.S., such relations mean increased cooperation on terrorism and illegal immigration.24 The differences in tendencies and goals for the actors in this system will become the center of analysis during the Problem Frame.

#### Mexican manufacturing is critical to address challenges facing the U.S. – picks up the slack for U.S. manufacturing

Bañuelos et al 12 (Carlos Guzmán Bofill, Ana María Rivas Llamas, Carlos Casas Guerrero, Juan Ángel Vargas Plata, Juan Carlos Téllez Girón Barrón, Luis Anthony Olivé Hawley, Sebastián Escalante Bañuelos, Natalia Herrero Martínez, Izael Mijangos González, June, http://www.promexico.gob.mx/work/models/promexico/Resource/1985/1/images/Aerospace\_CHIHUAHUA\_ENG.pdf)

In the last decade, Mexico has proven that it has the capabilities and talent in advanced manufacturing to supply the international market of the aerospace industry. The integration of design and advanced manufacturing capabilities on a national level prove that the Mexican industry has included high technology and engineering in its processes. Through the projects identified in this Road Map, which involves the efforts of academia, industry and government, Chihuahua will become the leading A+D cluster in Latin America in precision manufacturing for the high-tech industry and dual-use goods. This exercise identified projects and factors that will promote Chihuahua’s ability to attract future high technology investments for the aerospace and defense sector by as well as creating the capabilities to optimize the sector’s industrial competitiveness in the region, such as: the creation of a talent management platform; reducing dependency on the importation of molds, dyes and tooling in the sector; and making better use of future investments that have been encouraged by Mexico’s acceptance in the WA. Chihuahua has been able to determine the right path to reach its maximum potential and become one of Mexico´s most competitive regions in the aerospace sector with a medium- and long-term vision. The road to success has been forged, and the coming years will be bursting with opportunities and new challenges for Chihuahua.

#### Mexico is key – the US can’t solve

Bañuelos et al 12 (Carlos Guzmán Bofill, Ana María Rivas Llamas, Carlos Casas Guerrero, Juan Ángel Vargas Plata, Juan Carlos Téllez Girón Barrón, Luis Anthony Olivé Hawley, Sebastián Escalante Bañuelos, Natalia Herrero Martínez, Izael Mijangos González, June, http://www.promexico.gob.mx/work/models/promexico/Resource/1985/1/images/Aerospace\_CHIHUAHUA\_ENG.pdf)

The United States our major commercial partner is going through a talent crisis due to a lack of engineering graduates, added to constant cuts in defense spending, which complicates the upkeep of its current abilities to research, develop and produce defense and high-tech dual-use items. Mexico has more engineering graduates per capita than the United States and skilled and engineering labor costs are more competitive in Mexico; the technological sophistication of its manufactured goods is above that of BRIC countries such as India and Brazil. These three factors make Mexico the best answer to the issues that affect the United States. The creation of the SCE and Mexico’s acceptance into the WA have laid the foundation to guarantee national surveillance during the export of restricted and dual-use technologies and goods. According to conservative estimates, the WA will enable the national industry to access a potential high-technology export market of close to an additional 11.3 billion dollars per year, added to the potential creation of between 30 and 40 thousand highly paid jobs in the next five years.7 Chihuahua’s advanced manufacturing vocation (landing gears, fuselages, engines, harnesses and precision machining) make it the ideal destination for projects in the A+D cluster. Furthermore, the Federal Government is in negotiations with the US Department of Defense to develop a regional aerospace and defense manufacturing block focused on Buy NAFTA. This could be completed with the signing of a MoU between the US Department of State and the Ministry of National Defense (SEDENA)

#### Manufacturing drives innovation and pharmaceuticals

Swezey 11 (Devon Swezey, Project Director for Breakthrough Institute where he works as an energy and climate policy analyst and Ryan McConaghy, pg online @ <http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/BTI_Third_Way_Idea_Brief_-_Manufacturing_Growth_.pdf>)

New manufacturing thrives on and drives innovation. Manufacturing is a core component of the nation’s innovation ecosystem. Firms engaged in manufacturing re-invest a significant portion of revenues in research and development (R&D). Overall, the manufacturing sector comprises two-thirds 9 of industry investment in R&D and employs nearly 64% of the country’s scientists and engineers. 10 Manufacturers also have unique opportunities to apply new technologies for specialized functions and achieve economies of scale at the plant or firm, 11 making the return on manufacturing R&D significant. The transition to advanced manufacturing will enhance the sector’s role in fostering innovation and developing and commercializing new technologies. Advanced manufacturing industries, including semiconductors, computers, pharmaceuticals, clean energy technologies, and nanotechnology, play an outsized role in generating the new technologies, products, and processes that drive economic growth. Advanced manufacturing is also characterized by the rapid transfer of science and technology into manufacturing processes and products, which in and of itself drives innovation. The research-to-manufacturing process is cyclical, with multiple feedbacks between basic R&D, pre-competitive research, prototyping, product development, and manufacturing. This opens new possibilities for product development and manufacturing. 12

#### Tech innovation solves extinction

Zhong 07, CEO at Jade Bird Dashing, 7-31-7 (Roger, “The Effects and Influences of Technology on Society and Humyn Kind,” http://scienceray.com/technology/applied-science/the-effects-and-influences-of-technology-on-society-and-humyn-kind/”)

The question that persists however, is, “Is technology in fact harming our society as a whole?” Albeit the fact that this is a remarkably intricate question of sorts, it can be answered with a simple answer. The actuality of this situation remains that technology is by no means detrimental to our society here in the United States, civilization throughout the world, or to the greater humynity of the humyn race; instead, it is vital to its survival. Nuclear Technology To illustrate this point, let us first examine an exceedingly significant technological advance of our time, nuclear technology. Nuclear technology is research that involves the reactions of atomic nuclei. It has many vital applications in modern society, the most prominent of which are nuclear weapons, nuclear medicine, and nuclear power. The most controversial of these is, without a doubt, nuclear weapons. First created by the United States in 1945 during World War II, they were developed out of the fear that Nazi Germany would first develop them. A weapon of incredible power, a single nuclear weapon has to potential to decimate, level, and destroy an entire city. The first and only times a nuclear weapon has been used are in World War II, when the United States bombed the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the “Little Boy” and “Fat Myn” bombs, respectively. The usage of these bombs allowed for the near instantaneous end to the destructive World War II. Although two cities were leveled and many lives were lost, the situation involving the usage of these nuclear weapons is not nearly as negative as one may perceive. Had the bombs not been dropped, Japan would not have surrendered, and it would have without a doubt prolonged the war for months or even years. This would have forced an Allied Forces ground invasion of Japan in an effort to end the war, which would have resulted in the loss of many more people than caused by the deployment of the two nuclear weapons. When you look at the usage of nuclear technology, you must look at the situation from the viewpoint of humyn society as a whole, and not from a standpoint of an individual. While the nuclear bombs destroyed two cities and killed many, they ended a horrific World War II and prevented the loss of many other lives. Today, in more modern terms, nuclear weapons play a huge role in our lives. As citizens of the United States, it is common knowledge that we are guaranteed many degrees of freedoms and rights, but have you ever considered who enforces our right to these freedoms in the world? The military might of the United States is the key to us retaining our democratic freedoms. Being in possession of nuclear weapons is not only a positive thing, it allows for us to be free. By holding an arsenal of nuclear weapons, we have a nuclear deterrent. In this sense, we prevent wars and conflicts from escalating into another World War by instituting world order. By having nuclear technology, we are ensuring the well-being, longevity, and freedoms of the humyn race. Internet Technology Another prominent technological innovation that well represents our society today is the Internet. The Internet is the worldwide, publicly accessible network of interconnected computer networks that transmit data between themselves. It is an extremely large network that consists of countless smaller networks. The World Wide Web is accessible only through this Internet infrastructure which allows us our access to websites, email, file sharing, downloads, and media. As well as being an important provider for us common citizens who wish to access the World Wide Web, the internet serves a much greater purpose. It allows for the sharing of information almost instantaneously between scholars, researchers, and others. It allows for information to be shared from the United States to China in less than a second. Before the times of the internet, the other alternatives to transmit information were not nearly as efficient or effective. The Internet allows for us to, in some ways make the world smaller. In the days of today’s stock markets, financial infrastructure, global news organizations, powerful militarizes, strong governments and big corporations, instantaneous communication is an asset we can not afford to lose. The Internet allows for our society in modern day times to interconnect and promote globalization and information sharing. Medical Technology Perhaps one of the most vital technological advances in our society today is in the field of humyn medicine and health sciences. This field deals with the maintenance, prolongment, and restoration of humyn health through the study, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disease and injury. Medicine is an area where knowledge is obtained, then applied to treatment. It has been around at least as far as the beginning of recorded history, perhaps even farther. Today, modern medicine is practiced within a well-developed framework of health-care infrastructure. Research in the field of medicine has allowed for the development of many new treatments, drugs, medicines, and solutions that have allowed for the dramatic prolongment of the humyn lifespan. Today, with the influence of medicine, the lifespan of the average humyn is only increasing. Medicine in today’s world provides the most vital of all services; it ensures the survival of the humyn race as a whole. Review Now, let us review the implications of technology on our civilization here on Earth as a whole. Could the notion of technology possibly have any basis? Simply put, it does not have any credibility of any sort. Technology itself does not signify any concrete object or thing; instead it collectively portrays humyn kind’s achievements as a whole. Any advancements, abilities, creations, undertakings, views, or knowledge of us as humyns are in essence technology. This definition alone refutes the argument that technology is detrimental. Take for instance the three significant technological advances of the humyn race covered in this article: nuclear technology, the internet, and medicine. Nuclear technology, an important advancement for our society, creates a world order, protects the inhabitants of the world, and ensures the longevity, freedoms, and well-being of the entire humyn race. Also, the internet allows for our society to inter-connect and progress further into enlightenment. Perhaps most important of all, medicine, allows for us to ensure our own survival on this planet. These three technologies well represent technology as a whole, and clearly show that technology is extremely beneficial to our society. Only by advocating and advancing technology, can we as humyns, and as humynity, succeed.

#### Mexican pharmaceuticals are key

NAPS 4/11/13 (North American Production Sharing Incorporated, <http://www.napsintl.com/news/index.php/2013/04/11/the-medical-device-industry-manufacturing-in-mexico-has-a-clean-bill-of-health/>)

[Medical device](http://www.napsintl.com/medicaldevice.php) companies manufacturing in Mexico continue to exhibit steady growth with no sign of a slow down in sight. As costs in the United States and Eastern Europe continue to rise, especially with the implementation of “Obamacare” and its direct impact on medical device companies, more organizations are considering [manufacturing in Mexico](http://www.napsintl.com/manufacturinginmexico.php) as a viable solution. No other place in Mexico is this more evident than in Tijuana, where they now claim the largest concentration of medical device companies in all of North America. The ability to provide both timely deliveries and consistently high quality products are a few reasons why medical device manufacturers are choosing Mexico. Also, there is a tremendous base of talented labor with experience in medical device, [automotive](http://www.napsintl.com/auto.php), electronics, aerospace and other sophisticated industries to support the growth of manufacturing in Mexico. Furthermore, the labor laws in Mexico provide companies much more flexibility in terms of compensation, scheduling and seasonality, which plays an important roll on profitability. Another factor drawing medical device manufacturers to Mexico is the government’s enforcement, and employee’s respect, for intellectual property. Unlike many other low-cost manufacturing countries, Mexico is known for its low piracy rates, which cost companies billions of dollars a year. One of the challenges facing these companies is understanding the business landscape and culture in Mexico, which is why many of these firms are choosing to outsource their administration and compliance management to shelter companies. A good shelter company will handle 100% of the administration, including Humyn Resources in Mexico, Payroll in Mexico, Accounting in Mexico, Import/Export in Mexico and Environmental, Health & Safety in Mexico, allowing the manufacturer to focus on production and quality control. “We are receiving a record number of inquires from medical device manufacturers around the world who want to explore Mexico as a competitive solution,” said Scott Stanley, Sr. Vice President of North American Production Sharing, Inc. (NAPS), Tijuana’s largest and most sophisticated shelter service provider. “NAPS guides these companies through the process of feasibility by providing all the facts and figures about expanding into Mexico so sound business decisions can be made. Thereafter, we essentially become partners and typically work together for many years.” With an increase in demand for medical device products, not only in the United States but also within Mexico’s public health sector, Mexico will continue to be the primary choice for medical device manufacturing.

#### Pharmaceuticals is key to the development of DOD non-lethal chemical weapons

The Sunshine Project 03 (“Pentagon Perverts Pharma with New Weapons”, http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/pr/pr110203.html)

The conventional view is that pharmaceutical research develops new ways to treat disease and reduce humyn suffering; but the Pentagon disagrees. Military weapons developers see the pharmaceutical industry as central to a new generation of anti-personnel weapons. Although it denied such research as recently as the aftermath of the October theater tragedy in Moscow, a Pentagon program has recently released more information that confirms that it wants to make pharmaceutical weapons. And on February 5th, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld went a big step further. Rumsfeld, himself a former pharmaceutical industry CEO (1), announced that the US is making plans for the use of such incapacitating biochemical weapons in an invasion of Iraq (see News Release, 7 February 2003). The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) and the US Army's Soldier Biological Chemical Commynd (SBCCOM) are leading the research. Of interest to the military are drugs that target the brain's regulation of many aspects of cognition, such as sense of pain, consciousness, and emotions like anxiety and fear. JNLWD is preparing a database of pharmaceutical weapons candidates, many of them off-the-shelf products, and indexing them by manufacturer. It will choose drugs from this database for further work and, according to Rumsfeld, if President Bush signs a waiver of existing US policy, they can be used in Iraq. Delivery devices already exist or are in advanced development. These include munitions for an unmynned aerial vehicle or loitering missile, and a new 81mm (bio)chemical mortar round. Many of the Pentagon’s so-called "nonlethal" (bio)chemical weapons candidates are pharmaceuticals. Different names are used for these weapons ("calmatives", "disabling chemicals", "nonlethal chemicals", etc.). Used as weapons, all minimally aim to incapacitate their victims. They belong to the same broad category of agents as the incapacitating chemical that killed more than 120 hostages in the Moscow theater. That agent was reported to be based on fentanyl, an opiate that is also among the weapons being assessed by JNLWD. In the US, pharmaceutical fentanyl is sold by Johnson & Johnson’s subsidiary Janssen Pharmaceutica. Remifentanil, a closely related drug, is a GlaxoSmithKline product. US military contractors have identified a host of other agents manufactured by a Who's Who list of the pharmaceutical industry. In 2001 weapons researchers at the Applied Research Laboratory of Pennsylvania State University assessed the anesthetic drugs isoflurane and sevoflurane, produced by Syngenta and Abbott Laboratories, respectively. The same Penn State team recommended other drugs for "immediate consideration," some of which are in the chart below. The Pentagon is also interested in industry’s new ways to apply (bio)chemicals through the skin and mucous membranes, which could bring previously impractical drug weapons closer to reality by overcoming technical hurdles related to delivery of certain agents.

#### Those are good – prevent collateral damage

Alexander 99, Retired U.S. Army colonel, an author, and a consultant to various U.S. government agencies. He spearheaded the research on nonlethal weapons at Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1999 (John B., Oct 1st, “Nonlethal Weapons: When Deadly Force Is Not Enough”, The Futurist, L/N)

The military and law enforcement situations mentioned so far are fairly clear cut and a logical extension of current practices. However, the future of nonlethal weapons lies in far more important areas. Many of the potential enemies of the future are nontraditional. In the past few years the impact of terrorism and organized crime has been felt around the world. In most cases, response by means of conventional force is unsuitable or inadequate. When the enemy commingles with an innocent civilian population, it is not appropriate, and often counterproductive, to use bombs or missiles to attack them. As was seen earlier this year in Yugoslavia, even precision weapons can occasionally go astray and hit an unintended target. Without the development of advanced nonlethal weapons, the options available to political leaders and military commynders are too limited. It is under circumstances in which lethal weapons could lead to much broader engagements that nonlethal weapons take on strategic importance. An example of a situation that seems to have gone tragically wrong is the 1998 U.S. cruise missile attack on a pharmaceutical company in Sudan. This attack was undertaken based on a belief that the factory was supporting Osama bin Laden, a terrorist who had allegedly instigated and coordinated bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. The factory, located near the Sudanese capital city of Khartoum, was hit by cruise missiles at night in hopes that civilian casualties would be minimal. It was later learned that the factory was targeted on erroneous information and that people did die in the attack. This incident highlights the limitations of conventional weapons. In the future we need to have weapons that can degrade or destroy such facilities without the collateral damage caused by high explosives. Very few of these weapons are being thoroughly researched. However, with some effort more weapons can be developed to make long-range, nonlethal strikes against terrorist infrastructures.

#### That prevents a world war

Close 98, Arab affairs specialist for the CIA for twenty-six years & an independent consultant on the region, 1998 (Raymond, “The Only Effective Defense Against Terrorism is To Rebuild America's Reputation For Fairness,” The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November)

Despite U.S. government claims to the contrary, there is, in my opinion, a serious question whether our action in bombing alleged terrorist sites in Afghanistan and Sudan was a justifiable violation of the accepted and respected norms of international law. The attacks were on the sovereign territory of another legally recognized state with which we are technically at peace. We can attempt to justify this action by quoting Osama bin Laden's "declaration of war" on the American government and the American people, without distinction between them. But that is to claim, is it not, that the government of Afghanistan and the government of the Sudan abetted, and therefore share complicity in, acts of war against the United States? In fact, all that Afghanistan seems to have done was to provide Bin Laden with the sanctuary where the acts against us were planned. (Not the location where they were carried out.) We must now be ready to accept the full implications of this interpretation of our international rights. This means, it seems to me, that we are declaring one of two conditions to be true: A. That the United States makes the rules by which it acts in the world community. We are a law unto ourselves. Do we really want to say that? B. Or, that if one state believes it has enemies who are being granted refuge in another country, it is permissible to launch bombing attacks against those elements without the knowledge or permission of the legitimate host government. Is setting that precedent always going to redound to our benefit? Have we thought about that carefully? Most of us accept the premise that terrorism is a phenomenon that cannot be defeated by brute force, but only by ideas, by persuasion, by the amelioration of its causes -- whether real or imagined. Terrorism has only one real asset, in the final analysis -- the passion and commitment of its adherents. Are humyn passions capable of being altered by cruise missiles? Having accepted that premise intellectually as reasonable and civilized, we now have to live with the fact that in other international situations in the future, others may emulate our resort to violence, taking the law into their own hands to launch attacks against other members of the international community if they feel their national interests are similarly threatened. **This is how world wars start.**

#### Mexican manufacturing key to US aerospace

Mecham 7/16 (Michael is apace writer for Gannett News, California Bureau Chief and correspondent for Congress, Aviation Week, 7/16/13, “Mexico’s Welcome Mat Attracts Aerospace Manufacturers”, <http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_04_01_2013_p44-562383.xml>\)

The aerospace influx has not happened overnight. Its roots date to the mid-1970s when U.S. companies, a mix of multinationals and lower-tier suppliers, began sending basic parts manufacturing and assembly tasks across the border, mostly to border towns like Tijuana and Mexicali but also deeper into the country to cities like Monterrey. Service operations followed, as did company research activities. However, it has been in the past decade that Mexico's aerospace manufacturing growth has mushroomed. Political reform led it to pursue a global free trade agenda vigorously and its 1994 signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) benefitted Mexico greatly. Still, it took about a decade for the aerospace sector to take off. Until 2004, growth was scattered, says Queretaro state Gov. Jose Calzada. Not anymore. “We've seen incredible changes in just the last five years,” he says The boom times are a testament to Mexico's geography, its embrace of free trade and adoption of legal mechanisms that provide a “soft landing” for foreign-owned factories. Local leaders clear red tape and amaze U.S. and European executives at how quickly they can put up factories. A typical response comes from Peter Huij, a senior Fokker Aerostructures executive in Chihuahua, about how quickly the company went from bare earth in May 2011 to a completed 75,000-sq.-ft. factory in November: “It would be impossible in Europe.” Behind all of this is Mexico's Maquiladora factory system for supporting foreign companies, which allows them to control their own destiny, importing raw materials such as aerospace-quality alloys, or wiring and then exporting the finished product tax-free. Foreign manufacturers commonly turn to a large service provider—Intermex and American Industries Group are leaders for the aerospace sector—that lease buildings to their clients and handle their human resources, tax and other business needs under Mexican law. About 80% of the aerospace companies in Mexico use such services. Of the 36 Maquiladoras registered by the Mexican government last year, six were in aerospace, including a GKN Aerospace plant in Mexicali, Latecoere in Hermosillo, coatings specialist Ellison Surface Technologies and Rolls-Royce turbine supplier JJ Churchill in Guaymas and a fourth division for Zodiac in Chihuahua. Under the Maquiladora system, Mexico allows resident foreign companies to control 100% of their businesses. They do not face the “local partner” rules so common elsewhere that limit foreigners to a maximum 49% share “They make it easy for you to do business down here,” says John Gardner, strategic program manager at Kaman Aerostructures, another newcomer in Chihuahua. “They provide a 'soft landing,' to get a quick startup—a good startup. We got a lot of support up front and afterward.”

#### Aerospace key to hegemony

Lexington Institute 13

[Public policy think tank, “America Is A Superpower Because It Is An Air Power”, 1/24, <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/142016/air-power-makes-america-a-superpower.html>] \*we don’t defend the gendered discourse of this evidence

There is no question that the United States has the best military in the world. The United States is unique in its ability to project military power to multiple regions of the world simultaneously, conduct multiple major combined and joint operations at a time and both defend the homeland and provide ongoing support to civil agencies. Europe, which spends about sixty percent of the U.S. defense budget and actually has more man and woman in uniform, was unable without significant U.S. support to conduct a single, modest campaign in Libya. The U.S. military continues to set the world standard with respect to most major military systems: nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, large deck amphibious warfare ships, nuclear attack submarines, strategic bombers, fifth-generation fighters, air and missile defenses, tanks and armored fighting vehicles and space and airborne ISR. Even though we don’t talk much about it the military’s cyber warfare capabilities are truly impressive. While the U.S. has the best ground, naval and amphibious forces in the world, one thing makes it a 21st Century superpower: its dominance as an air power. The United States alone is capable of deploying its aerial assets anywhere in the world. U.S. air power can hold at risk any target set in any country and can do so from multiple directions. The U.S. Air Force is the only one capable of delivering specially-designed conventional bombs large enough to destroy deeply buried and hardened structures.  Over the past two decades, the U.S. military has repeatedly demonstrated that it can destroy an adversary’s air force and air defenses in a matter of weeks. After that, hostile ground units were toast. The ability to rapidly seize control of the air means that no soldier has died in an air attack since 1953. Over a decade of wars, American air power from the land and sea provided continual responsive fire support for tactical units on the ground. Other nations have fighters and bombers, although America’s are the best. The U.S. also has the largest and most capable fleets of air transports, refueling aircraft and airborne ISR assets in the world. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force flew soldiers and heavy armor deep into Iraq to seize a critical target, the Haditha Dam. Since 2001, the Air Force has maintained a continuous air bridge to Afghanistan, more than 8,000 miles from CONUS. U.S. C-17 transports are today flying French troops and equipment into Mali. The U.S. Navy has a fleet of fixed wing transports, the C-2 Greyhounds, specifically for the purpose of moving parts and people to and from its aircraft carriers. The United States has crafted an ISR and strategic warning capability based on a sophisticated array of satellites, manned platforms and unmanned aerial systems.  Dominant air power is about much more than just platforms and weapons. It requires also the trained people and processes to plan and manage air operations, process, exploit and disseminate intelligence, identify targets and plan attacks, move supplies and route transports and repair and maintain complex systems. The U.S. had to send hundreds of targeteers to NATO to support the Libyan operation. Over decades, the U.S. military has developed an unequalled training establishment and set of ranges that ensure the highest quality pilots and other personnel. Finally, the U.S. is the dominant air power in the world because of its aerospace industrial base. Whether it is designing and producing fifth-generation fighters such as the F-22 and F-35, providing an advanced tanker like the new KC-46 or inventing high-flying unmanned aerial systems like the Global Hawk, the U.S. aerospace industry continues to set the bar. In addition, the private and public parts of the aerospace industrial base, often working together based on collaborative arrangements such as performance-based logistics contracts, is able to move aircraft, weapons and systems through the nationwide system of depots, Air Logistics Centers and other facilities at a rate unmatched by any other nation. The ability to rapidly repair or overhaul aircraft is itself a force multiplier, providing more aircraft on the flight line to support the warfighters. The U.S. military can go where it is ordered, respond rapidly to the crisis of the moment, move men, equipment and supplies around the world and dominate any place on the face of the earth as long as it desires because it is dominant in the air. As the Pentagon, Congress and the White House struggle with budget issues that could well require deep cuts to the military, they would be well advised to remember that it is air dominance that enables this country to remain a superpower.

#### The pursuit of hegemony is inevitable, sustainable, and prevents great power war

**Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth 13** – \*Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, \*\*John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, \*\*William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College (“Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement”, January/February 2013, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138468/stephen-g-brooks-g-john-ikenberry-and-william-c-wohlforth/lean-forward)

Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.

#### Primacy has resulted in the lowest level of war in history – best statistics prove

Owen 11 [John Owen, Associate professor in the University of Virginia's Department of Politics, recipient of fellowships from the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford, and the Center of International Studies at Princeton, PhD in international relations from Harvard, February 11, 2011, “Don’t Discount Hegemony, [www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)]

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war);the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.

## 2ac

### 2ac – manufacturing

**Our aff may contain an element of fear, but that’s not really the point – it’s about embracing freedom – their search for an authentic relationship to mortality recreates the worst kind of solipsism**

**Dollimore 98**, Sociology – U Sussex,

(Jonathan, Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture, pg. 221)

But freedom cannot embrace death. Despite taking so much from modern philosophers of death like Heidegger and Kojeve, Sartre finally has to eliminate death from the finitude of being. He takes Heideggerian nothingness into self, making it the basis of freedom, but he also privileges selfhood in a way which Heidegger emphatically did not, and resists Heidegger's embrace of death. Sartre knows that to take death so profoundly into being, as did Heidegger and Kojeve, threatens the entire project of human freedom as praxis, which is the most important aspect of Sartre's existentialism. Certainly, for Heidegger, authenticity did not entail praxis, and in his Letter on Humanism' he actually repudiated Sartre's attempt to derive from his work a philosophical rationale for existential engagement; so far as Heidegger was concerned, such engagement was only another version of inauthentic 'social' existence, a social evasion of the truth of Being. But was Heidegger's own truth of Being ever more than a state of authenticity whose main objective is obsessively to know or insist on itself as authentic? For all his talk of freedom, there remains in Heidegger a sense in which authenticity remains a petrified sense of self, paralysed by the very effort of concentrating on the profundity of Being, which always seems to be also a condition of mystical impossibility: 'Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein\* (Being and Time, p. 294). Not so for Sartre. He recognizes the modern project whereby death is Snteriorizcd . . . humanized (and] individualized\*, and that Heidegger gave philosophical form to this process. On the face of it, this is an attractive development, since death as apparent limit on our freedom is reconceptualized as a support of freedom {Being and Nothingness, pp. 532-3). But, against Heidegger, Sartre argues that death, far from being the profound source of being and existential authenticity, is just a contingent fact like birth, and this, far from being a limit, is what guarantees one's freedom. Heidegger's entire account of death rests on an erroneous conflation of death and finitude; finitude is essentially internal to life and the grounds of our freedom - 'the very act of freedom is therefore the assumption and creation of finitude. If I make myself, I make myself finite and hence my life is unique' - whereas death is simply an external and factual limit of my subjectivity (pp. 546-7). Quite simply, 'It is absurd that we are born; it is absurd that we die' (p. 547). This perhaps entails a fear of death, since 'to be dead is to be a prey for the living': one is no longer in charge of one's own life; it is now in the hands of others, of the living (p. 543). It is true that death haunts me at the very heart of each of my human projects, as their inevitable reverse side. But this reverse side of death is just the end of my possibilities and, as such, 'it does not penetrate me. The freedom which is my freedom remains total and infinite . . . Since death is always beyond my subjectivity, there is no place for it in my subjectivity' (pp. 547-8).

### 2ac – t – qpq

#### Counter Interpretation – Conditional and unconditional engagement are topical

Haass 2k – Richard N. Haass, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, “Engaging Problem Countries”, Brookings Policy Brief, No. 61, June,

<http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/18245/1/Engaging%20Problem%20Countries.pdf>?1

Engagement as a policy is not merely the antithesis of isolation. Rather, it involves the use of economic, political, or cultural incentives to influence problem countries to alter their behavior in one or more realms. Such a strategy can take a variety of forms. *Conditional* engagement is a government-to-government affair in which the United States offers inducements to a target regime in exchange for specified changes in behavior. This was the approach favored in 1994 when the United States and North Korea entered into a framework agreement under which Pyongyang pledged to curtail its nuclear weapons development in exchange for shipments of fuel, construction of a new generation of nuclear power-generating reactors, and a degree of diplomatic normalization. In contrast, *unconditional* engagement is less contractual, with incentives being extended without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Unconditional engagement makes the most sense in promoting civil society in hopes of creating an environment more conducive to reform.

### 2ac – security

#### The Role of the Ballot is to simulate the enactment of the plan—effective choices regarding Latin American foreign policy require the ability to test the real world outcomes of our scholarship and advocacies.

Baxter 10 (Jorge, Education Specialist, Department of Education and Culture in the Organization of American States, Former Coordinator of the Inter-American Program on Education for Democratic Values and Practices at the OAS, PHD in International Comparative Education and Policy from University of Maryland College Park, “Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Inter-American Journal of Education for Democracy, 3(2), 224-254, <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/ried/article/viewFile/1016/1307>, Accessed: 7/30/13)OG

In the context of international¶ education cooperation and international¶ development in Latin America, where¶ there are great asymmetries in power and¶ resources, it seems that this critique could¶ have some validity. However, rather than¶ concluding that deliberation and participation¶ should be reduced, one could conclude (as¶ is argued in this paper) that they should¶ be enhanced and expanded. Those that¶ advocate for a “thicker” democratization in¶ the region would likely advocate for a more¶ substantive approach to deliberation in policy¶ which establishes certain parameters such¶ as “education is an intrinsic human right,”¶ and which would place an emphasis on¶ achieving quality education outcomes¶ for all as the goal. This does not mean that¶ they would not advocate for deliberation but¶ rather would set parameters for deliberation¶ in order to ensure that the outcomes do not¶ lead to “unjust” policy (e.g., a policy that¶ might promote more inequity in education).¶ Those that advocate for a “thinner” approach¶ to democratization would tend to advocate¶ for a procedural approach to deliberation in¶ education policy and would most likely place¶ emphasis on equal opportunity of access¶ to quality education.¶ Instability critique: Education in Latin¶ America suffers from too much instability and¶ is too politicized. Increasing participation and¶ deliberation would only further politicize the¶ situation and polarize those who advocate for¶ educational reform and those who block it.¶ The average term of a minister of education¶ is one-and-a-half years; each time a new¶ minister comes to office, new policies are¶ passed which, according to deliberative¶ democratic theory, would need to be reasoned¶ and debated with citizens. Deliberation in this¶ context would promote even more instability¶ and would lead to further politicization of¶ education reform.¶ Response: Political instability and¶ lack of continuity in policy reform are serious¶ limitations that to some degree are inherent¶ in democratic institutions and processes. The¶ reality is that if any education reform is to¶ succeed in the long term, it needs more than¶ the efforts of governments or international¶ organizations. It needs the sustained support¶ of stakeholders across sectors (public,¶ private, and civil society) and over time. It¶ has been argued that the main problem in¶ basic education in Latin America is the lack¶ of a broad social consensus, recognizing¶ that there is a problem of equity and quality¶ in the provision of education (Schiefelbein,¶ 1997). This lack of broad social consensus¶ is especially challenging where there is, as¶ noted in the critique, a lack of continuity¶ in education reform. Reform in education¶ takes time, sometimes decades. Ensuring¶ continuity in education reform policies is¶ therefore crucial, and this requires public¶ consensus. Deliberative forums convening¶ government, private sector, and civil society¶ groups can contribute to developing this public¶ consensus and to providing more continuity¶ in policy. Deliberative forums combined¶ with collaborative projects can help promote¶ learning, distribute institutional memory,¶ support capacity-building efforts, and bring¶ more resources to bear on the education¶ reform process. Creating a space for citizens¶ to deliberate on the role of education is¶ fundamental for promoting broad social¶ consensus around education reforms. In Latin¶ America, the most innovative and successful¶ reforms have all created multiple and¶ continuous opportunities for diverse groups¶ across the education sector and society to¶ provide input and to have opportunities for¶ meaningful collaborative action. International¶ organizations, leveraging their regional and¶ international position, can contribute by¶ promoting policy dialogue and collaborative¶ actions among ministries and also with key¶ stakeholders across sectors. The challenge¶ is to develop a better understanding of how¶ deliberation can be used to promote more¶ collaborative as opposed to more adversarial¶ and partisan forms of politics. This is perhaps¶ one area which deliberative theorists need to¶ explore more.¶ 5. Power critique: The final critique relates¶ the possibility that increasing deliberation¶ and participation can lead to increased¶ inequality. Fung and Wright (2003) note¶ that deliberation can turn into domination¶ in a context where “participants in these¶ processes usually face each other from¶ unequal positions of power.” Every reform¶ in education creates winners and losers, and¶ very few create “win-win” situations. Those¶ in power would have to submit to the rules of¶ deliberation and relinquish “control” over the¶ various dimensions of democratic decisionmaking.¶ This is naïve and not politically¶ feasible.¶ Response: This is a valid critique¶ worth considering. Structural inequalities¶ and asymmetries of power in governments¶ and international institutions in Latin America¶ have facilitated domination by elites in terms¶ of authority, power, and control in politics.¶ Asymmetries of power in international¶ cooperation in education are also clear,¶ especially when powerful financial (World¶ Bank, IDB, IMF) or political (OAS, UNESCO)¶ organizations engage with local stakeholders¶ and condition policy options with funding¶ or political support. What this paper has¶ argued is relevant again here: that instead of¶ rejecting further democratization in the face¶ of these challenges, including the challenge¶ of elite “domination,” what is needed is more¶ and better democracy, defined in terms of its¶ breadth, depth, range, and control. Finally,¶ dealing with elite domination in international¶ deliberative forums will require conscious and¶ skilled facilitation on the part of international¶ organizations, which themselves are often¶ elitist and hegemonic.¶ Final Thoughts: So What?¶ Perhaps the most critical question¶ that emerges in the argument for increased¶ democratization and deliberation is simply:¶ So what? Does increased democratization and¶ deliberation actually lead to better outcomes¶ in education? More empirical research on this¶ critical question is needed. However, experiments¶ in deliberative democracy in education reform¶ in Brazil through the UNESCO and Ministry of¶ Education Coordinated Action Plan and Porto¶ Alegre‘s Citizen School, and also to some degree¶ at the international level with the OAS pilot¶ experiment in developing a more democratic¶ model of international cooperation from 2001-¶ 2005, have shown that deliberative processes¶ can enhance learning on the part of those¶ participating. Fung and Wright (2003) refer to¶ these experiments in deliberation as “schools¶ of democracy” because participants exercise¶ their capacities of argument, planning, and¶ evaluation. Deliberation promotes joint reflection¶ and consideration of others’ views. Citizens¶ who participate in deliberative forums develop¶ competencies that are important not only for¶ active citizenship (listening, communication,¶ problem-solving, conflict resolution, selfregulation skills) but also crucial for managing¶ change and school reform. Many of the same¶ skills that are developed through citizen¶ deliberation and participation are also essential¶ for transforming school cultures, promoting¶ “learning organizations” (Senge, 2000), fostering¶ communities of reflective practitioners (Schon,¶ 1991) and developing communities of practice¶ (Wenger, 2001). There is evidence from some¶ research that democratic interactions can create¶ knowledge that is more rigorous, precise, and¶ relevant than that produced in authoritarian¶ environments (Jaramillo, 2005). Another¶ important aspect of enhancing deliberative¶ democracy and democratization is that it moves¶ from a focus on individuals and their own¶ preferences towards more collective forms of¶ learning and collaboration.¶ Up to now, international organizations¶ have endorsed a “thin” version of democratization¶ that is content with formal and centralized¶ mechanisms of “representation” and “policy¶ dialogue.” If a new, more deliberative and¶ democratic model of cooperation in education in¶ the region were to emerge, what would it look¶ like?¶ First of all, a more deliberative and¶ democratic model of international cooperation in¶ education would involve more direct and deeper¶ forms of participation from everyday citizens,¶ including teachers, school directors, families,¶ school communities, students, and mesolevel¶ actors such as civil society organizations.¶ This participation would move beyond simple¶ consultation to more authentic forms of joint¶ decision-making and deliberation. The model¶ would involve more accountability on the¶ part of international organizations in terms¶ of transparency, and would require injecting¶ ethical reasoning into policies and programming.¶ In addition, a new more democratic model of¶ international cooperation would expand the¶ range of policy options available to countries¶ through devolution of authority, power, and¶ control, combined with oversight and horizontal¶ accountability mechanisms. A more democratic¶ model of international cooperation would stress¶ valuing, systematizing, and disseminating¶ local knowledge and innovation. Finally,¶ democratization and deliberation in international¶ cooperation in education would lead to enhanced¶ learning and agency on the part of participating¶ countries, groups, and individuals, and thus¶ contribute to better outcomes in terms of quality¶ and equity in education at national and local¶ levels.

**Their K creates a world without political enmity – creates a terrifying system without an exterior – enemies re-appear in internalized struggles – that causes worse biopolitical violence**

**Prozorov 06** /Professor of International Relations at Petrozavodsk State University, Russia/ [Sergei, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies]

Schmitt’s concern with the liberal effacement of pluralism in the name of cosmopolitan humanity does not merely seek to unravel hypocrisy or ridicule inconsistency but has more serious implications in the context of the transcendental function of enmity that we have introduced above. For Schmitt, the ‘pluriversal’ structure of international relations accords with his political ontology that affirms the ineradicability of difference, from which, as we have discussed, Schmitt infers the ever-present ‘extreme possibility’ and the demand for the decision on the enemy. Moreover, the actual pluriversal structure of international relations satisfies the criterion of equality between the Self and the Other by precluding the emergence of a global hierarchy, whereby a particular ‘concrete order’ lays a claim to represent humanity at large. While this pluralism does nothing to eliminate the ‘most extreme possibility’ of violent conflict, it may be said at least to suspend it in its potentiality by retaining the possibility that the ‘existentially different and alien’ might not become the enemy simply by remaining outside the ‘concrete order’ of the Self and thus positing no actual existential threat. Moreover, as long as the boundary between the Self and the Other is present, there remains a possibility that whatever conflicts may ensue from the irreducible ontological alterity, they may be resolved on the basis of the mutually recognised sovereign equality of the Self and the Other in the domain of the international, which by definition is effaced by any political unification of humanity.43 Thus, for Schmitt ‘it is an intellectual historical misunderstanding of an astonishing kind to want to dissolve these plural political entities in response to the call of universal and monistic representations, and to designate that as pluralist’.44 However, this dissolution of actually existing pluralism is not a mere misunderstanding, a logical fallacy of presupposing the existence of the unity that is yet to be established. In an invective that we consider crucial for understanding Schmitt’s critique of liberal ultra-politics, Schmitt approaches liberal monism with an almost existential trepidation: ‘What would be terrifying is a world in which there no longer existed an exterior but only a homeland, no longer a space for measuring and testing one’s strength freely.’45 Why is a world in which there is ‘only a homeland’, a Wendtian ‘world state’, posited as outright terrifying, rather than objectionable on a variety of political, economic, moral or aesthetic grounds? The answer is evident from the perspective of Schmitt’s ontology of alterity and the affirmation of the ‘extreme possibility’ of existential negation. If alterity is ontological and thus ineradicable in any empirical sense, then the establishment of a ‘domesticated’ world unity, a global homeland, does nothing to diminish the danger of the advent of the Other, but, on the contrary, incorporates radical alterity within the ‘homeland’ of the Self so that the ever-present possibility of violent death can no longer be externalised to the domain of the international. The monistic disavowal of alterity, of the ‘existentially different and alien’, is thus terrifying as it enhances the ‘most extreme possibility’ of killing and being killed. Schmitt’s objection to the liberal monism of the ‘homeland of humanity’ is therefore two-fold. First, the effacement of ontological pluralism, which subsumes radical alterity under the ‘universal homeland’, must logically entail the suppression of difference through the 3: ‘Since even a world state would not be a closed system, it would always be vulnerable to temporary disruptions. However, a world state would differ from anarchy in that it would constitute such disruptions as crime, not as politics or history. The possibility of crime may always be with us, but it does not constitute a stable alternative to a world state.’47 Thus, struggles against hegemony or domination, which indeed have constituted politics and history as we know them, are recast as a priori criminal acts in the new order of the world state, calling for global police interventions rather than interstate war. ‘The adversary is no longer called an enemy, but a disturber of peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of humanity.’48 The exclusionary potential of universalism is evident: theoretically, we may easily envision a situation where a ‘world state’ as a global police structure does not represent anything but itself; not merely anyone, but ultimately everyone may be excluded from the ‘world unity’ without any consequences for the continuing deployment of this abstract universality as an instrument of legitimation. In Zygmunt Bauman’s phrase, ‘the “international community” has little reality apart from the occasional military operations undertaken in its name’.49 Thus, for Schmitt, if the monistic project of liberalism ever succeeded, it would be at the cost of the transformation of the world

#### Rejection of securitization causes the state to become more interventionist—turns the K

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The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of **problematising weak or unstable states** and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework **there were at least formal and clear demarcations**. This has the consequence of **entrenching international power inequalities** and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means **the condemnation of millions to** **a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival**. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful sta**tes**, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

#### Alt fails – Securitizing discourse is the only way to get conservatives on board with democracy assistance – Backsliding is inevitable without tangible policies on the ground

Dr. Steven Heydemann- Director Center for Democracy and the Third Sector, Georgetown University – 2006, In the Shadow of Democracy: Review Article, Middle East Journal, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Winter, 2006), pp. 146-157, JSTOR

Thus, three long years after the invasion of Iraq, the question of Arab democracy continues to cast a very long shadow over the Middle East. It looms not only over Arab governments, but hangs heavily over Washington as well, where the White House's dogged insistence that democracy must happen only deepens debate about why it hasn't. What accounts for the persistence of authoritarianism in the Arab world? What strategies might carve open space for political change? If, as the Bush Administration itself has argued, the Arab world is not doomed to an authoritarian future then what will it take to shift the region's political trajectory onto a democratic path? Coercive strategies of democratiza- tion via forced regime change have lost support among all but a shrinking group of die- hard conservatives. US-supported democracy promotion programs have had some posi- tive effects - though at a considerable cost to American taxpayers.8 Yet their ultimate aim remains frustratingly out of reach. How then can we account for the mixed track record of US efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East? These questions are not new, but the Iraq War and the emphasis of the Bush Adminis- tration on democracy in the Middle East have given them new salience. In particular, the argument that democracy abroad is needed to ensure security at home has not only raised the stakes associated with nation building, but linked democracy promotion to US secu- rity interests more explicitly than at any time since the height of the Cold War. Not surprisingly, the urgency that now frames the question of Arab democracy is mirrored in the proliferation of op ed pieces, policy briefs, expert reports, blue ribbon task forces, and the other paraphernalia that routinely accompany the passage of a global superpower through the international system. If much of this effort is directed toward Iraq and the implications of the Iraq War for other Arab states, it has also generated thoughtful reflection on processes of democracy promotion and democratization, and on the causes of persistent authoritarianism, by scholars and specialists on the Middle East, the rule of law, and democratic transitions. Notable in this regard are the writings of Thomas Carothers, Marina Ottaway, and other researchers associated with the Middle East Reform Initiative of the Carnegie Endowment for Interna- tional Peace, assembled in a recent collection, Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East. The reassertion of tight links between security and democracy has transformed the debate about nation-building and democracy promotion among conser vatives as well. Francis Fukuyama's State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century stands out as a useful contribution in an ongoing battle of ideas concerning the relationship between American conservatism and nation building in American foreign policy. MAKING DEMOCRACY UNIVERSAL In keeping with the conventions of the genre - analysis of current events designed to influence the direction of US policy - these works present themselves as self-consciously of the moment. They draw on and feed into the rhetoric of urgency, ferment, and turmoil that are often used to mark an issue as significant. Carothers and Ottaway, for example, title the introduction to Uncharted Journey, "The New Democracy Imperative." They begin the chapter by noting that the "issue of democracy in the Middle East has erupted." After years of neglect, it is now a topic that is "heatedly and ceaselessly" debated by policy-makers. Similarly, Fukuyama urges attention to the problem of state weakness as a "national and international issue of the first order," one that has acquired new importance because of the immediate security threats associated with state weakness. This style is no doubt seen as helpful in grabbing the attention of crisis-saturated policy-makers. Yet in this instance, at least, it has unfortunate consequences. In particular, it obscures the extent to which today's debates about prospects for Arab democracy grow out of a much longer conversation concerning possibilities for collective self-governance outside the West. Despite their relentless focus on the present, these arguments have a past. And this history matters not only for putting current debates in perspective, but for under- standing the fault lines that cut through them and, thus, for making sense of how the Middle East moved from a marginal position within democratization debates at the time of the first Gulf War, to the central position it occupies today. This past also matters for understanding the assumptions that lead Fukuyama to write a book in which the need for nation building coexists uneasily with classical neo-conservative reservations about whether nations can, in fact, be built. Both the work of Fukuyama and of the Middle East Reform Initiative are anchored in conceptions about, and disagreements over, the possibilities for collective self-gover- nance in the post-colonial world that extend back to the League of Nations, if not before. At the core of democracy promotion literature - even literature critical of the way it is being carried out at the moment - is the conviction that democracy can and should be promoted. Democratization, moreover, is seen largely - though not exclusively - as a matter of technique, of procedure, of program design and implementation. We can imagine the possibility of creating Democracy Without Democrats, for example, through the disci- plining effects that democratic procedures have on political actors, even those who are not, in principle, committed democrats.9 And while local contexts, such as Islam, might impede the smooth movement of democratic institutions and practices from one setting to another, these obstacles do not reflect an underlying incompatibility between local norms and democratic practices, or suggest limits to the possibilities for nation building and democratic governance. It is not axiomatic, in this view, that if we get the policies right all else will follow. The authors in Uncharted Journey understand that techniques of democracy promotion reflect underlying ideas about how democracy works, and many of these, they argue, are deeply misguided when applied outside the United States. Hawthorne, for example, effectively debunks myths about the role of civil society in democratization, including, first, that "civil society activism can alone create a democratic opening," and second, "that civil society consists of latent democratic forces simply awaiting activation by Western do- nors." Similarly, Ottaway "cautions.. .against the assumption that by promoting women's rights the United States contributes to democratization of the Arab world..." (p. 116). These are valuable insights, and they deserve careful consideration. Unlike accounts that either dismiss prospects for Arab democracy, or see it simply as a matter of mechanics, the chapters in the Carothers and Ottaway volume occupy a productive, if critical middle ground. Nonetheless, the volume reflects a conviction about the possibilities for demo- cratic change in the Arab world that has become increasingly widespread in recent years, even if, as Fukuyama's book makes clear, the idea generates considerable unease among American conservatives. What is less visible in these accounts, as in much of the recent literature on democracy promotion, is a sense of just how recently democracy acquired the status of a universally accessible political form, where this view came from, and how it has altered understand- ings about prospects for democratic change in the Middle East. Nor does it convey just how precarious this notion is and how easily it could be undone, either by events in the Middle East or by changes within the American political arena. The idea of collective self-governance as a universal model for the organization of politics has been a long time in the making, but became prominent in US foreign policy only with the post-war emergence of the United States as a global superpower and the closely related rise of modernization theory within the discipline of political science.'0 As Leonard Binder pointed out more than 40 years ago, in the middle of the 20th century democracy was widely viewed as an exceptional political form. To master it, states re- quired extended periods of tutelage as mandates of Western powers, during which societ- ies could be trained in its requirements.'1 Even this, moreover, represented a significant shift from an earlier conception in which societies that lacked the essential foundations for collective self-governance would gradually acquire them under the benign shelter of Western protectorates. By the 1950s, however, as stage-theories of economic and political development became prominent, democracy had become simply the final phase of a de- velopmental sequence through which all states, and all peoples, were expected to pass. As Daniel Lerner noted in his classic book on modernization in the Middle East, "[d]emocratic governance comes late, historically, and typically appears as a crowning institution of the participant society," but eventually it makes an appearance, even in the Arab world.'2 This conception of democracy as a universally accessible political form had decisive consequences for the study of the Middle East, and its echoes can be heard today. In the 1950s and 1960s, it led researchers to study the social and economic preconditions of democracy in the Middle East. In 1956, for example, economic historian Charles Issawi published a seminal article, "The Economic and Social Foundations of Democracy in the Middle East," that defined the core themes of what would grow to become a major indus try, not only among regional specialists but in the social sciences more broadly: establish- ing the links between capitalism, development, and democracy."3 Pre-figuring the more prominent work of sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset1", Issawi argued that democracy had failed in the post-colonial Middle East because "the economic and social basis which it requires is as yet non-existent."' 5 Drawing on the experiences of Western European democracies and their offshoots (Australia, the United States, New Zealand), Issawi iden- tified the relevant preconditions as: "size of territory and population, level of economic development, distribution of wealth, industrialization, homogeneity of language and re- ligion, degree of education, and habit of cooperative association." 16 For the next decade or more, the idea of preconditions (influenced more by Lipset than by Issawi) animated the research of prominent Middle East specialists, including Manfred Halpern's work on the New Middle Class, which suggested that economic modernization in the region was beginning to create the social and economic foundations that might possibly produce a slow transition to democracy.'7 The general notion that increasing social and economic complexity - particularly processes of industrialization and class differentiation - would require more complex political forms was commonplace in the modernization theories that were widely applied to the Middle East during these years, even if the link between political complexity and democracy was sometimes implied rather than explicit. AGAINST DEMOCRATIZATION No less important, the idea of democracy as a universally accessible form also reso- nated within policy circles, and with far more significant consequences than the debates that roiled academia. By the 1970s, and during the Carter years (1977-1980) in particular, possibilities for nation building had emerged as a central battleground between Demo- crats and Republicans, including a still nascent neo-conservative movement that cut across party lines. President Jimmy Carter's interest in human rights and democracy had become a lightening rod for security hawks, and the critique of democracy promotion that resulted helped to consolidate the rejection of nation building as a core feature of contem- porary American conservatism. The iconic statement of the emerging neo-conservative position was Jeane Kirkpatrick's article, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," that appeared in Commentary in 1979.18 In a sharp critique of the "Carter administration's foreign policy failure" and its "disastrous effects on the U.S. strategic position," Kirkpatrick singled out US support for "the replace- ment of moderate autocrats friendly to American interests with less friendly autocrats of extremist persuasion." The "collaboration" of the US in efforts to replace Shah Muhammad Riza Pahlavi of Iran and President Antonio Somoza of Nicaragua represented an alarming and dangerous shift in US foreign policy. At the root of these policy blunders, however, were the modernization theories that had misled the administration into the false belief that democracy everywhere was not only possible, but near inevitable. To reinforce the illegitimacy of these ideas, she tendentiously characterized the em- phasis that scholars had earlier placed on the relationship between capitalism and democ- racy as evidence of their Marxist inclinations. In their view, Kirkpatrick tells us, "Democ- racy could function only in relatively rich societies with an advanced economy, a substan- tial middle class, and a literate population, but it could be expected to emerge more or less automatically wherever these conditions prevailed." From the vantage point of the late 1970s, she countered that, "this picture seems grossly oversimplified." The preconditions of democracy are not economic, but moral and cultural. Democratic values, moreover, are not created automatically, but require time to be learned and assimilated within a society: "Decades, if not centuries, are normally required for people to acquire the necessary disci- plines and habits." Of course, sound institutions and economic development are needed as well, but these appear secondary in Kirkpatrick's worldview to the cultural dispositions that she viewed as essential for democratic development. Without them, support for re- gime change in the developing world will simply reduce America's standing by promot- ing anti-American extremists. Thus, the appropriate target for US democratization policy is not right-wing dictator- ships, which, given time, will develop an internal demand for democracy, but Communist societies. As she observes, in one of the more widely cited observations of the period: "Although there is no instance of a revolutionary 'socialist' or Communist society being democratized, right-wing autocracies do sometimes evolve into democracies - given time, propitious economic, social, and political circumstances, talented leaders, and a strong indigenous demand for representative government." By the end of the following decade, and the spread of popular uprisings that swept Communist governments from power, the inaccuracy of this prediction would become stunningly clear. Yet by then, opposition to democracy promotion had become deeply embedded within the neo-conservative wing of the Republican Party. It became central to Republican critiques of the Clinton Administration, and advocates of this view rose to posi- tions of considerable power. It was in no small part opposition to Clinton's expansion of America's role in nation building that defined George W. Bush's 2000 election campaign. The collapse of Communist regimes, with little evidence of emergent demand for democracy in the authoritarian Middle East, might have undermined the theoretical claims of neo-conservatives. Yet, it would take more than two decades, and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, before a Republican administration repudiated the Kirkpatrick posi- tion and embraced a far more radical conception of nation building, doing so precisely on the grounds that democracy should be seen, after all, as a universally accessible political form. However, the intervening years were not easy ones for democracy advocates in the Middle East. Kirkpatrick's legacy, both in its emphasis on the normative underpinnings of democracy and on the primacy of strategic interests lingered in American relations with Arab governments. The failure of democracy to secure a foothold in the region under- mined assumptions about its universality, and gave new life to culturalist arguments about Middle East exceptionalism, the incompatibility of Islam and democracy, and the lack of "disciplines and habits" in the Arab world that might support democratic change. Despite hopeful indicators of political liberalization across the region in the late- 1980s, the Arab world thus remained marginal both to the democracy promotion efforts of the Clinton Administration and, within academia, to the growing literature on authoritar- ian breakdown and democratic transitions. Indeed, the exclusion of the Middle East from the study of emerging democracies led Michael Hudson, in an article published in this journal during the first Gulf War (1991), to castigate "[t]he editors of a recent four-volume survey on democracy in developing countries" who "ignored the Arab world entirely." Noting that some 115 million people lived in Middle Eastern states that had been identi- fied by the Economist as showing "elements of pluralism," he asked whether "Orientalist stereotyping of Arabs, so evident in parts of American academia and the news media [had] blinded mainstream analysts to the possibilities of more participatory politics in this region."'9 In effect, Hudson's plea was to restore the sense of democracy as a universal possibil- ity, to reject claims about the absence of cultural prerequisites, and to take seriously the signs of political change in the region - "remarkable rumblings of political liberalism and even democratization in the past several years." While skeptical about the value of US democracy promotion efforts, Hudson, recalling the earlier work of Issawi, Lipset, and Halpern, predicted that rising democratic demands, via the "process of developing a more effective civil society," would be "driven inexorably by the socioeconomic changes, even the painful ones, that are ubiquitous throughout the Arab world." Yet this plea, which captured a more widely held view among regional specialists at the time, went unheeded both in policy circles and among social scientists. It was soon overtaken not only by the rise of post-Communist states as the focus of nation-building and democracy promotion efforts under President Bill Clinton, but by the rapid retreat of Arab regimes from their brief liberalization experiments - partly as a response to, but also fueling, the rise of militant Islamist movements. In the absence of Arab democrats, the focus of scholars and policy-makers alike shifted in technical and procedural directions. As noted above, they explored possibilities for the emergence of democracy without democrats, doing away altogether with a concern for preconditions.20 They also preferred, as Daniel Brumberg indicates, to promote liberalization rather than full-fledged democra- tization, in the hope of deepening the social, economic, and institutional foundations for eventual democratic change at some point in the future.2' With the election of President Bush in 2000, and the expectation that democracy promotion and nation building would soon be downgraded as priorities of US foreign policy, even these ambitions began to appear overdrawn. NATION-BUILDING RED UX: BRINGING THE ARAB WORLD BACK IN In the event, of course, things changed. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 upended the Bush Administration's approach to nation building and democratization. The ripple effects of this shift are still reverberating, both in the field of democracy promo- tion, and among conservatives in the United States. It would be hard, in fact, to overesti- mate the extent of the rupture in administration policy - and among neo-conservatives - that accompanied the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the immersion of US forces in nation building on a massive scale in Afghanistan and Iraq. Speaking at the National Endowment for Democracy in November 2003, President Bush explicitly associated the United States with the view that Kirkpatrick had worked to undermine. In its place, he adopted the perspective of a more radical wing of the neo- conservative movement, represented by Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and Douglas Feith. "In many nations of the Middle East," he noted, "democracy has not yet taken root. And the questions arise: Are the peoples of the Middle East somehow beyond the reach of liberty? Are millions of men and women and children condemned by history or culture to live in despotism? Are they alone never to know freedom, and never even to have a choice in the matter? I, for one, do not believe it. I believe every person has the ability and the right to be free." Dismissing the cultural foundations of Kirkpatrick's view, he flatly rejected the assertion by "some skeptics of democracy.. .that the traditions of Islam are inhospitable to.. .representative government." He rejected the strategic side of her argument, as well, declaring that, "sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe - because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty."22 It would be dangerous for America, he told his audience, to "main- tain the status quo." Addressing a British audience two weeks later, the President went even further. The West, he complained, had been too "willing to make a bargain, to toler- ate oppression for the sake of stability. Long-standing ties often led us to overlook the faults of local elites. Yet, this bargain did not bring stability or make us safe. It merely bought time, while problems festered and ideologies of violence took hold."23 Virtually overnight, the President turned his back on more than two decades of conser- vative doctrine. He committed himself and the US government, however reluctantly, to a view of democracy as a universally accessible model of governance, and to ensuring its promotion, above all, in the one region that had thus far proven most resistant to it: the Arab world To read the volumes by Carothers and Ottaway and by Fukuyama in this context is to encounter two very distinct reactions to the shifts that produced the United States' latest foray into the political transformation of the Middle East. For the former, the overarching concern is how to seize a moment of opportunity created by the Bush Administration to push the apparatus of democracy promotion toward a more encompassing conception of political change - a task they undertake by hammering home the limits of liberalization, the ineffectiveness of interventions that focus on procedures and mechanics, the impossi- bility of imagining that democratization can be pursued without ruffling the feathers of Arab governments, and the imperative of recognizing the seemingly obvious idea that the transformation of politics requires direct engagement with political change - not simply "capacity building" and other indirect strategies to secure the social or institutional pre- conditions for democracy. As the editors note in their conclusion, "to have a chance of success, democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East will require new approaches carefully tailored to the regional circumstances, as well as a willingness to go beyond low-risk indirect approaches to take on the harder, more central challenges of expanding the depth and breadth of political contestation and encouraging real distributions of power" (p. 251). Like their intellectual predecessors, these authors are committed to the idea of democ- racy as a universally accessible model. Yet unlike them, and in contrast to their conserva- tive counterparts, their impatience with the notion of preconditions clearly reflects the hard lessons of the past 40 years, both theoretical and practical. These include a keen awareness of the resilience of autocracy in the Middle East and the capacity of Arab governments to exploit limited strategies of reformism to advance their own political aims. Their diagnoses come with a warning label: unless we can translate newfound enthu- siasm for democracy promotion in the Arab world into meaningful gains on the ground the moment will be lost; the old dynamic of half-step forward, half-step back will reassert itself. For Fukuyama, the question of nation building poses a different set of problems, partly ideological and partly pragmatic. His response is twofold: first, to provide an intellectual rationale justifying conservative support for nation building in general and, second, to establish what, precisely, nation building can accomplish, seeking both to restore the core principles articulated by Kirkpatrick, and to provide an alternative to the radicalism that defines the Bush Administration's current approach. In addressing the ideological question, Fukuyama endorses the strategic position of the Bush Administration: nation building is a priority because weak states threaten Ameri- can security. However, for Fukuyama, the task at hand is not nation building, per se, far less the naive pursuit of democratization, but the more limited and entirely instrumental job of strengthening states to ensure their capacity to contain the extremist ideologies that now threaten the United States, chief among them militant Islam. State-strengthening might seem perverse, he writes, in an era marked by a global trend toward reining in and shrink- ing the state, shifting functions it once performed to the market. Yet, it has become neces- sary today, for our own protection. Taking a page from the Bush Administration's pre-Iraq script, he writes that "[flor a while, the United States and other countries could pretend these problems [failed and weak states] were just local, but September 11 proved that state weakness constituted a huge strategic challenge as well. Radical Islamist terrorism com- bined with the availability of weapons of mass destruction added a major security dimen- sion to the burden of problems created by weak governance" (p. xi). Fukuyama devotes a full chapter (one of three major sections of a volume that grew out of lectures delivered in early 2003) to the elaboration of this view. What his discussion underscores, however, is just how deep resistance to nation building runs among neo- conservatives - with all that this implies about the precariousness of current policies. Absent a commitment in principle to the possibilities for effective collective self-gover- nance in developing states, the security argument becomes critical. Only by securitizing nation building, with the limited aim of improving state capacity, does US engagement with it become palatable. To his credit, Fukuyama is willing to confront aspects of conser- vative orthodoxy in identifying the sources of state weakness, concluding that neo-liberal programs of economic reform have mistakenly confused the weakening of state institu- tions with the strengthening of markets.24

#### China is a threat –

#### a. New Reports Demonstrate Strategic Intent For Nuclear Strikes on Both Coasts

By Miles Yu Thursday, 10/31, 2013 Inside China: Nuclear submarines capable of widespread attack on U.S.

: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/31/inside-china-nuclear-submarines-capable-of-widespr/#ixzz2jR2ln3EC

Chinese state-run media revealed for the first time this week that Beijing’s nuclear submarines can attack American cities as a means to counterbalance U.S. nuclear deterrence in the Pacific.¶ On Monday, leading media outlets including China Central TV, the People’s Daily, the Global Times, the PLA Daily, the China Youth Daily and the Guangmin Daily ran identical, top-headlined reports about the “awesomeness” of the People's Liberation Army navy’s strategic submarine force.¶ PHOTOS: Take that, China — check out the U.S. Navy's nuclear submarines¶ “This is the first time in 42 years since the establishment of our navy’s strategic submarine force that we reveal on such a large scale the secrets of our first-generation underwater nuclear force,” the Global Times said in a lengthy article titled “China for the First Time Possesses Effective Underwater Nuclear Deterrence against the United States.”¶ The article features 30 photos and graphics detailing, among other things, damage projections for Seattle and Los Angeles after being hit by Chinese nuclear warheads and the deadly radiation that would spread all the way to Chicago.¶ China’s sub fleet is reportedly the world’s second-largest, with about 70 vessels. About 10 are nuclear-powered, and four or more of those are nuclear ballistic submarines capable of launching missiles.¶ Heavily influenced by Soviet naval models that stressed underwater forces, China’s nuclear submarine development began with the reverse-engineering of a Soviet Golf-class conventional-powered sub in the 1950s.¶ In the 1980s, China developed its first ballistic missile sub, the Type 092 Xia-class, which has 12 launch tubes for the Julang (Giant Wave)-1 missiles. The JL-1 had a limited range and failed multiple test launches.¶ In 2010, a new class of missile sub, the Type 094 Jin class, entered the service. It is capable of launching 12 to 16 JL-2 missiles with a range of about 8,700 miles, covering much of the continental U.S. with single or multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicle warheads.¶ PHOTOS: See the Navy's biggest, baddest, destroyer¶ Chinese calculations for nuclear attacks on the U.S. are chillingly macabre.¶ “Because the Midwest states of the U.S. are sparsely populated, in order to increase the lethality, [our] nuclear attacks should mainly target the key cities on the West Coast of the United States, such as Seattle, Los Angeles, San Francisco and San Diego,” the Global Times said.¶ “The 12 JL-2 nuclear warheads carried by one single Type 094 SSBN can kill and wound 5 million to 12 million Americans,” the Global Times reported.¶ China also has developed land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles — notably the DF-31A, which has a range of 7,000 to 7,500 miles.¶ “If we launch our DF 31A ICBMs over the North Pole, we can easily destroy a whole list of metropolises on the East Coast and the New England region of the U.S., including Annapolis, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Portland, Baltimore and Norfolk, whose population accounts for about one-eighth of America’s total residents,” the Global Times said.¶ All the state-run press reports stressed the point that the PLA’s missile submarines are now on routine strategic patrol, “which means that China for the first time has acquired the strategic deterrence and second strike capability against the United States.”¶ “Our JL-2 SLBMs have become the fourth type of Chinese nuclear missiles that threaten the continental United States, after our DF-31A, DF-5A and DF-5B ICBMs,” said the Global Times.

#### Things are getting better now because of hegemony—intensity and number of wars are at the lowest in history

Drezner 5—Professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Daniel, “Gregg Easterbrook, war, and the dangers of extrapolation”, Blog @ Danieldrezner.com, 5/25, <http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html>

Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas staring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo--combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: War has entered a cycle of decline. Combat in Iraq and in a few other places is an exception to a significant global trend that has gone nearly unnoticed--namely that, for about 15 years, there have been steadily fewer armed conflicts worldwide. In fact, it is possible that a person's chance of dying because of war has, in the last decade or more, become the lowest in human history. Is Easterbrook right? He has a few more paragraphs on the numbers: The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the extent and intensity of global combat is now less than half what it was 15 years ago. Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out. First, he neglects to mention the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon called the United States right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the reason the "great powers" get along is that the United States is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes. [If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago: We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world. The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away. Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and the spread of democracy are right out the window. UPDATE: To respond to a few thoughts posted by the commenters: 1) To spell things out a bit more clearly -- U.S. hegemony important to the reduction of conflict in two ways. First, U.S. power can act as a powerful if imperfect constraint on pairs of enduring rivals (Greece-Turkey, India-Pakistan) that contemplate war on a regular basis. It can't stop every conflict, but it can blunt a lot ofthem. Second, and more important to Easterbrook's thesis, U.S. supremacy in conventional military affairs prevents other middle-range states -- China, Russia, India, Great Britain, France, etc. -- from challenging the U.S. or each other in a war. It would be suicide for anyone to fight a war with the U.S., and if any of these countries waged a war with each other, the prospect of U.S. intervention would be equally daunting.

### 2ac – lca cp

#### Obama won’t do it

**Cappiello 2011 -** Dina Cappiello is an award-winning environmental journalist who follows the story looking for specific, factual information about environmental problems that communities need in order to push for change (“Gore: On Global Warming, Obama Has Changed Little” 6/22, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=13900390)

The Democrats' leading environmental messenger, Al Gore, is declaring that President Barack Obama has failed to lead on the issue of global warming. In a 7,000-word essay posted online Wednesday by Rolling Stone magazine, Gore says the president hasn't stood up for "bold action" on the problem and has done little to move the country forward since he replaced Republican President George W. Bush. Bush infuriated environmentalists by resisting mandatory controls on the pollution blamed for climate change, despite overwhelming scientific evidence that the burning of fossil fuels is responsible. The scientific case has only gotten stronger since, Gore argues, but Obama has not used it to force significant change. "Obama has never presented to the American people the magnitude of the climate crisis," Gore says. "He has not defended the science against the ongoing withering and dishonest attacks. Nor has he provided a presidential venue for the scientific community ... to bring the reality of the science before the public." http://a.abcnews.com/assets/images/spacer.gif

Gore does credit Obama's political appointees with making hundreds of changes that have helped move the country "forward slightly" on the climate issue, but says the president "has simply not made the case for action." He is the second Clinton administration official this month to express disappointment with Obama on environmental issues. Former Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt, in a speech in early June, said Obama had yet to take up the "mantle of land and water conservation...in a significant way." Gore's comments mark a turnaround for the nation's most prominent global warming advocate, whose work on the climate problem has earned him a Nobel Prize and was adapted into an Oscar-winning documentary.

#### LCA fails

**Warner 2009** - a member of the Technology Systems and Sustainability Analysis Group in the Strategic Energy Analysis Center (Ethan, May “Evaluating the Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) Models for Use in a Low Carbon Fuel Standard Policy”)

The LCA method has two major limitations. First, performing an LCA is resource and time intensive and such analyses often are limited by the availability of data and the effort needed to gather the data. 3 Second, LCA is not a policy making tool. It will not determine which products or processes are the most cost effective, efficient, or desirable. Therefore, the information developed in LCA study should be used as part of a more comprehensive decision making or evaluative process. Essentially, LCA is a highly informative, although labor intensive, tool that helps inform policy decisions.

#### Mexico is key to the navy – copper nickel tubing

General Adams, 13 – Brigadier General for the U.S. Army (Retired) (John, “REMAKING AMERICAN SECURITY: SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES & NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS ACROSS THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE” http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/RemakingAmericanSecurityMay2013.pdf)

In addition to these domestic companies, the European conglomerate KME and several companies in Mexico also produce Cu-Ni tubing for the U.S. Navy. However, other than Ansonia Brass & Copper, KME is the only company capable of producing this larger diameter tubing according to U.S. military specifications. As a result, the U.S. domestic production capability of Cu-Ni tubing is at risk, potentially leaving the U.S. Navy solely dependent on foreign manufacturers for this important supply chain.

#### More naval ships solve missile interception and delivery

\*improves c3I operations

**AFCEA 11–** Unclassified report released by The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association that serves the US military (“Information Dominance Industry Day Questions and Answers”, 4/5/11, Available Online @ http://www.afcea.org/mission/intel/documents/MasterAnswerDocument05APR11.pdf)//MM

C3I provides the backbone of command and control (C2) in all warfare areas, including BMD. The BMD mission is inherently Information Dominance-centric, and can be divided between “Left of Launch” and “Right of Launch.” In “Left of Launch”, effective cyber warfare and penetrating knowledge of the adversary are critical to shaping the battlespace. “Right of Launch” is focused on network support to the warfighter. Navy BMD C3I enables C2 to make rapid decisions inside the adversary’s decision cycle. The Navy is currently leveraging a proven and fully functioning BMD C3I architecture. Navy ships with BMD capability and key Fleet Command and Control nodes are part of the BMD system. This includes mission planning systems, sensors, fire control, and command and control centers from the tactical edge connected to the National level. In BMD, the Navy closely works with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), STRATCOM, and other services on C3I matters to ensure effective BMD is delivered from BMD-capable ships and the future Aegis Ashore, via the Regional and Fleet Commanders, to BMDS at the National level. While we have a working structure, we clearly see growing adversary threats which necessitate better performance and capacity on the part of our networks. **More ships are needed** to intercept more ballistic missiles in a complex tactical/operational environment. To this end, we are improving network capabilities and access through the addition of Advanced Time Division Multiple Access Interface Processor (ATIP) and improved integration of Maritime Operations Centers (MOCs) with Joint Tactical Terminal (JTT) and Navy Multiband Terminal. We are improving BMD Mission Planning across the theater by integrating Aegis Mission Planner, MIPS-Maritime IAMD Planning System, and C2BMC. Starting in FY12 we have proposed adding 15 TF-IAMD Navy personnel with BMD expertise in each MOC.

**That’s key to solve Chinese ASBM threats**

**AFCEA 11–** Unclassified report released by The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association that serves the US military (“Information Dominance Industry Day Questions and Answers”, 4/5/11, Available Online @ http://www.afcea.org/mission/intel/documents/MasterAnswerDocument05APR11.pdf)//MM

Adversary ballistic missiles threaten our allies worldwide and our homeland- Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, and CONUS itself. Chinese development of so-called ‘carrier killer’ ASBMs compounds the Navy BMD challenge as our afloat forces become targets of exoatmospheric ballistic missiles in addition to the variety of cruise missiles and other threats we face. The Navy must integrate BMD into an effective, broader Integrated Air and Missile (IAMD) capability. The Navy Air and Missile Defense Command (NAMDC) at Dahlgren has the task to promote rapid delivery of new IAMD technologies; support development and validation of IAMD requirements for Joint and Navy processes; lead Navy IAMS concept, doctrine, and tactics development, and experimentation; and, advocate Navy positions and capabilities in Joint forums. We are closely aligned with NAMDC through the BMD roadmap as a part of the Navy Ballistic Missile Defense Enterprise. These alignments provide us the opportunities to play vital roles in IAMD, bringing important capabilities from across N2/N6. These include, on the right side of the kill chain, **improved C3I and network integration and operational coordination**. On the left side of the kill chain, this means development of constant and penetrating knowledge of the adversary and cyber skills to provide persistent access to adversary networks. Across the full kill chain, it means supporting the ability to synchronize kinetic and non-kinetic responses to give our afloat forces the confidence to operate effectively in the face of a full range of threats.

**China uses ASBM’s – causes escalation**

**Chimerica 11 –** (“Attack by an ASBM”, 2011, Chimerica War, Online @ <http://www.chimericawar.org/carrier_killer.html>)

Although it is entirely credible that China would unexpectedly strike a carrier without any warning or notable increase in regional tension this would actually be very out of character for the PLA China has a predictable history of giving many warnings before striking an opponent. Of course, this doesn’t discount commanders being so blinkered to the signs, like McCarthur and blundering on regardless, but characteristically, China can usually be counted on to give clear warning signs of an attack. In the modern age, it is more than likely that tensions would have significantly risen or actual conflict taking place before the ASBM is considered as a strike option. James Kraska’s story of a single, untraceable ASBM sinking the USS George Washington out of the blue is unrealistic and the global atmosphere is more likely to resemble Harper’s piece on Chinese Missiles and the Walmart Factor. As offensive operations rarely take place in isolation, we can confidently surmise that the US and China will have already gone through a significant ratcheting up of tensions, both economically and militarily, and any decision to hit a carrier will not be made in a bubble. Therefore, on the verge of war, the PLA will be doing everything it can to find carrier battle groups while the battle groups will be doing everything they can to slip into favorable positions un-noticed. It should be noted here that the concept of an ASBM first came about from a study where they claimed the over-the-horizon radar could differentiate between different ships by comparing, over time, the frequent air activity around the carrier. Due to this, in a heightened war-situation we can reasonably assume that the carrier will not be flying multitudes of planes if it’s moving into a potential battle position and forward air cover could easily come from fighters flying from any number of global bases and using air-refueling. The carrier will be in a high alert, probably moving at a good pace to out run subs and in complete communication silence. There are any number of war scenarios existing on what the carrier would be doing, but let’s say, for the sake of this narrative, that the carrier is moving at 28knots with only a small escort, including some Aegis, and aiming to join up with a larger group to move forward as an overwhelming battle fleet into a hot zone off China’s coast. To any over-the-horizon radar a silent, cruising carrier would be almost undistinguishable from other ships, so the PLA would need multiple positive IDs to launch an attack. On top of this, any number of carrier battle groups could be coming from a multitude of directions. The Pacific Ocean is purportedly 166million square kilometers. The Indian Ocean is 44million square kilometers. The South China Sea alone is over 3.5million square kilometers. So the analogy of, “looking for a needle in a haystack,” doesn’t even do it justice. Carriers maybe big, but on the scale of things they are infinitesimally small in a huge mass of monotone sea. Let’s say for arguments sake that the PLA detection systems and more importantly the guys working them are totally on the money and manage to nail down a battle group to a certain area. The overhead satellites are then able to pick out ships moving in a specific direction. The satellites then need to keep a track on the ships movement in real time. Not as easy as it sounds. Don’t forget, GPS works by a device actively calling out to the satellites to find it. This will not happen in a war situation, it will be a completely passive search. It will be up to the controllers, probably based somewhere deep in China’s interior, to manually control the satellites guidance system to first locate, then precisely follow and plot the battle group's direction. Let’s say that the modern Chinese satellites can lock onto the carrier and follow it automatically once it is located. This still isn’t good enough to target though. The next step is to get an over-the-horizon radar signal and preferably drones on target. At this point it is just not credible to assume that the PLA would target a carrier based on just satellite co-ordinates alone, even if numerous satellites were triangulating it. They will need some other kind of terminal guidance system to help the missiles hit the target. The margin of error on a fast moving, possibly erratic target would be too great, even for a suite of missiles. Bear in mind, conventional DF-21s missiles carrying only a 1000lb warhead and traveling at Mach 10 are going to need to hit, otherwise they’ll just make a very, very fast splash into the sea. (see here for some perspective) It would certainly put the fear of God into the sailors who saw it, but it wouldn’t stop the ships. On top of this, carriers are designed to get hit, or have planes crash into them so are incredibly durable and tough. Even a direct hit by a DF-21 with it's huge wave of kinetic energy is not guaranteed to terminally incapacitate a carrier. It would probably need multiple direct hits, then followed by sustained submarine attacks to sink it. The analogy comes to mind of getting a hand-full of glass marbles and trying to throw them into a plastic cup from a few feet away. Chances are you might get one or two in the cup if you're really good, but it's not guaranteed, and the ones that miss just don't count at all. Firing a missile from 2000km away and getting it witih 20-30metres is a fantastic shot - but it just doesn't count. It has to be a bull everytime. Let’s assume that things are going great for the PLA and it is able to get a confirmed “eyeball” sighting by a paramilitary fishing boat of the carrier. So the satellite data can now be corroborated with a first hand account that it is definitely a US carrier in the area that they're concentrating on. This of course assumes that the US Navy wouldn’t be neutralizing or jamming any boats in the vicinity, but let’s say the information gets through to the 2nd Artillery. On top of this, another lucky break happens, a PLA sub sights the carrier and also gives a confirmed sighting, but does not engage because the carrier is going too fast. The carrier could be zipping along at 30knots, with the max speed of the Jin around 20knots, if it wasn’t already cued for an attack it could only watch as it rushed by. A message is sent to other Chinese subs to rendezvous at a certain point along the carriers proposed course and lie in wait. The subs will be used in a second tier attack on the carrier after it has received a volley from the DF-21s. With two confirmed sightings and a satellite track the PLA controllers are confident that they are zeroing in on a carrier kill and send word to the Central Military Commission, 套机构两块牌子(CMC) The CMC is already in session in its war room and begins to seriously consider making a strike on the battle group given the positive identification and reliable satelite track. Word is now sent to the countless mobile DF-21s launchers across the country to get ready for a launch. Mathematicians and strategists in the PLA begin to try and predict the carrier’s route and decide upon the best place to try and launch a strike and cue up the subs for the definitive kill. Other attack platforms are readied to complement the attack once it is underway. UAVs are launched from Chinese ships and the mainland to directly locate the carrier. As the US ships draw closer, Chinese over-the-horizon radars begin to try and distinguish the carrier from the escorts. Meanwhile, off the coast of China, the multiple over-the-horizon radars light up like bonfires for the numerous US subs that are lying quietly in position, cued to strike on command at Chinese ground targets and subs. The carrier is not blindly, blundering into a Chinese trap but is part of a larger, counter trap being set by the US submarine fleet. The CMC, gets on to the Emergency Hotline to Washington and warns them that, “they can not be held responsible if any US warships enter Chinese Territorial Waters”. For Washington, this is “game-on”. They were expecting the CCP to give a final warning and they characteristically do, right on cue. All US ships in the region are put on alert that a missile attack is imminent and aimed at the incoming carrier battle groups. Minutes drain by like hours. The carrier group moves forward and despite the US Air Force shooting down a number of PLAAF stealth, UAVs, two of them slip through the net and lock onto the carrier. The carrier is now painted with exact, real-time coordinates streaming from two undetected UAVs, the over-the-horizon radar and satellite tracking. This is enough data to complete the ASBM terminal guidance system. The 2nd Artillery quickly informs the CMC that they have all the data they need to launch an attack on the incoming battle group. Time is of the essence now. The carrier needs to be neutralized before it can get in range of the Chinese mainland with its F-18s. An effective battle group can punch 600 attacks on target in just one day and repeat that for days if not weeks. It is essential that if the strike takes place it happens as soon a possible while the carrier is still far out to sea. The 2nd Artillery commanders urge their superiors that they have been incredibly lucky to have quickly amassed such reliable data and the time is now to strike hard, so as to knock the Americans onto their back foot. With a carrier sunk, or at least incapacitated, this will forestall any greater push by the Allied forces and could possibly weaken the 'fickle' US public’s will to fight. This is enough for the CMC and they order the strike. After receiving the orders, the 2nd Artillery begins to transmit the target data to the 100 DF-21s that will launch. Note: this is not a static target with fixed coordinates that they’re aiming to hit. So, the data can’t be finalized. The DF-21s will be launched into the air without the final co-ordinates in their guidance system. This will have to come later, while it’s flying at Mach 10. Which is not to be underestimated as an incredibly difficult thing to do. Fortunately, Chinese scientists have already cracked this incredibly difficult task. The 2nd Artillery’s C4ISR are confident that they can transmit to the terminal guidance system on board the warhead at the critical time using the over-the-horizon radar data, UAVs and their new, advanced satellite communications streaming. The DF-21 will launch into one orbit, then change direction and zero in on the carrier. The speed at which this is done will out maneuver the Aegis and Patriot tracking systems, that traditionally rely on predictable trajectories of missiles to intercept. The DF-21s begin to fire-up. Meanwhile, the eyes and ears of the US military are scouring China for signs of a missile launches. Just like in Iraq they have a window of detection as the missiles are readied for firing. Only this time, the US can’t strike them as they prepare, as they’re on the Chinese Mainland in protected airspace and this would be crossing a significant ‘red-line’ at this stage in the conflict. However, as soon as the birds are airborne, all bets will be off. As the mobile launchers prepare to launch all US subs in the region, including a suite of Ohio class (SSBNs) nuclear warhead carrying subs are put on high alert for imminent launch. As the Chinese missiles begin to fire up squadrons of B-52s and B1s take off from Guam, Diego Garcia and Barksdale packing conventional and nuclear weapons. Within minutes the US has hundreds of bombers in the sky. Nuclear Silos across the US go to high alert for imminent launch. Russian listening posts pick up the Chinese actions and also all the US activity and engage in similar counter measures, readying its army for a possible nuclear exchange. The minutes now quickly drain down and all the 21s are ready to fly. Final word goes out to the 2nd Artillery commander who relays this to the CMC one last time. Convinced that sinking a carrier will put the US on the back foot they decisively give the go ahead, and 50 of the 100 missiles are sent skyward. STOP… Take a second to contemplate the gravity of this scenario… At this exact moment China has launched 50, unknown sub-orbital ballistic missiles into the air. The type and destination are unknown. It could be part of an ASBM package, or it could be a preemptive nuclear strike on an unspecified country? The US, Russia, India, UK and France would all go to DEFCON One and could all release an instant nuclear counter strike on China. The world has evolved to avoid using ballistic missiles as the preferred weapon of choice in war as they could easily provoke a full blown nuclear exchange. This is why the ASBM system is so out of whack with current weapon systems. It can not be differentiated from a preemptive nuclear strike. The US is now faced with two choices, are these airborne missiles conventional or nuclear? If they believe they are nuclear then China will be on the receiving end of an unprecedented nuclear retaliatory strike by the The Allies and possibly Russia, even India. The US may also assume that these missiles are part of an ASBM package but may still be nuclear, so again it would launch nuclear weapons to counter. The US has almost no way of knowing what kind of missiles have just been launched from the mobile carriers. So much for **the ASBM** keeping the US at arms length. Instead it **has the potential to cause a nuclear exchange.** The only way China could guarantee that it wouldn’t receive a nuclear counter-strike from launching so many DF-21s into the sky is if they pre-arranged some signal to inform the US, Russia, India, France and Britain that they were only using conventional weapons. Such a system would be inherently flawed because why would anyone believe them, and if it did work it would be giving away too much intelligence. “Oh, hi, yeah, so this is Xi Xinping, yeah, um, you know those missiles we just launched well they’re conventional, not nuclear ok, so can you make your response appropriate?” A funny joke, but really, how else would you suggest China, a nuclear armed country, convince the other nuclear nations of the world that the launching of multiple, sub-orbital ballistic missiles is not a nuclear preemptive strike but is only aimed at ships? This not so very small point aside, let’s assume for the sake of the story, that the US doesn’t carry out a massive retaliatory, nuclear strike but is confident that it's only a bunch of conventional DF-21s flying at Mach 10 aimed at its carrier battle groups. Only? As soon as the birds are airborne, US subs and possibly stealth bombers off the coast will begin targeting the Chinese over-the-horizon radars, which will have two choices, keep transmitting data or risk getting hit. If they power down and relocate quickly, they may live, but the DF-21s will be left flying blind. As China has launched missiles from the mainland at the US Navy, it will no longer be considered a naval battle and the numerous subs and stealth bombers will begin attacking relevant C4ISR on the Chinese mainland. With a billion dollar carrier at stake and the lives of thousands of Americans it’s a “no brainer” now and a race against time as the US tries to take out critical Chinese infrastructure on the coast. The DF-21s, which will probably be launched from further inland will take around 12minutes to reach their target as they will first need to leave the atmosphere, and then come back down at Mach 10. Plus their target is a 1000kms out. The question will be, can the US cruise missiles take out enough critical assets to break the delicate information chain needed to bring the DF-21s down on target? Remember, only a bull counts. Near misses count for nothing, no matter how close. In unison to this missile exchange, military assets right across the Pacific Rim will go on to a maximum war footing. Militaries in Japan, Korea, Australia, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, India, Vietnam and Russia will go to their highest alerts. More than likely, there will be air-combat in the areas around Japan as twitchy pilots from US and the JMSDF engage the PLAAF in dog fights. Across Japan, Patriot batteries stir into life and a string of 35 Aegis Cruisers from the US, Japan, Korea, and Australia brace for missile intercepts. Japan would assume that any number of these missiles could be aimed at her and would immediately begin to mobilize a counter attack.

### 2ac – shunning

#### Mexico is not a flagrant or willful violator — improvements are being made *with U.S. assistance*.

McGovern 12 — James McGovern, Member of the United States House of Representatives (D-MA), holds n M.P.A. from American University, 2012 (“Human Rights in Mexico,” Hearing Before the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission in the United States House of Representatives, May 10th, Available Online at http://tlhrc.house.gov/docs/transcripts/05\_10\_2012\_Human\_Rights\_in\_Mexico.pdf, Accessed 07-22-2013, p. 6)

Both the United States and Mexican governments have taken steps to try to address these serious problems. Over the past several years, the U.S. Congress and the Obama administration have shifted much of the focus of U.S. assistance to Mexico under the Merida Initiative from security assistance to support for strengthening the rule of law and judicial institutions in Mexico. The Government of Mexico has also taken some significant positive steps, including mandating ethics training for all Federal Police, changing regulations on the use of force by the police and passing laws that strengthen the authority of Mexico's human rights commission, provide for compensation of victims of human rights abuses and require protection of at-risk journalists and human rights defenders. These are encouraging steps, but much more needs to be done to ensure that these reforms are fully implemented, to establish a more effective and transparent Mexican judicial system, and to address the pervasive problems of corruption and impunity. Accountability for abuses is particularly important so that the Mexican people believe that the era of impunity is starting to come to an end. For its part, the United States should continue to provide Mexico with assistance to strengthen the rule of law in Mexico and advance respect for human rights.

#### Weigh consequences—moral absolutism *reproduces evil*.

Isaac 2 — Jeffrey C. Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University-Bloomington, 2002 (“Ends, Means, and Politics,” *Dissent*, Volume 49, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via EBSCOhost, p. 35-36)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. [end page 35] This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### No morality d-rule—nations *aren’t* moral actors. Rational self-interest best metric for action.

Kennan 86 — George F. Kennan, Professor Emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University, served as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1952) and Yugoslavia (1961-1963), 1985 (“Morality and Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1985/1986, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 216)

Second, let us recognize that the functions, commitments and moral obligations of governments are not the same as those [end page 205] of the individual. Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience. No more than the attorney vis-a-vis the client, nor the doctor vis-a-vis the patient, can government attempt to insert itself into the consciences of those whose interests it represents. Let me explain. The interests of the national society for which government has to concern itself are basically those of its military security, the integrity of its political life and the well-being of its people. These needs have no moral quality. They arise from the very existence of the national state in question and from the status of national sovereignty it enjoys. They are the unavoidable necessities of a national existence and therefore not subject to classification as either "good" or "bad." They may be questioned from a detached philosophic point of view. But the government of the sovereign state cannot make such judgments. When it accepts the responsibilities of governing, implicit in that acceptance is the assumption that it is right that the state should be sovereign, that the integrity of its political life should be assured, that its people should enjoy the blessings of military security, material prosperity and a reasonable opportunity for, as the Declaration of Independence puts it, the pursuit of happiness. For these assumptions the government needs no moral justification, nor need it accept any moral reproach for acting on the basis of them.

### 2ac – politics

**Wont Pass – House GOP Wont Take a Comprehensive Bill, Piecemeal Will Delay Long Enough That the Election Kills Key Reforms, and Rubio Bailed**

By Ashley **Lopez** Florida Center for Investigative Reporting **10/29**/2013 Diaz Balart Casts Doubt On President’s New Immigration Reform Strategy Published on October 29, 2013 http://fcir.org/2013/10/29/immigration-reform-obama-house/

President Obama said in a speech at the White House last week that he would be open to the U.S. House’s approach to voting on immigration bills one by one, which could either be immigration reform’s savior or its demise. Rep. Mario Diaz Balart, R-Miami, who has been instrumental in getting immigration reform passed in the House, has been telling reporters that this change in tone is by no means a guarantee that reform will pass during this Congress.¶ A group of Republican House members are now working to get a series of bills together that most of their caucus would vote for. In order for the president to sign those bills, though, one of them would have to provide a path to citizenship for some of the million undocumented immigrants here in the U.S.¶ **But the issue of legalization remains one of the most contentious issues in the House**. It would even more contentious if a vote is taken close to the 2014 election.¶ And as The Miami Herald notes, the House’s strategy of passing bills one-by-one might prolong the process well into the upcoming election, thus **dooming immigration reform:**¶ And while Obama called for the House to pass a large bill that could then be reconciled with the Senate version, House Republicans want to approach any changes in piecemeal fashion, a process that at best would push any significant progress into next year.¶ Boehner spokesman Brendan Buck said Thursday that the House “will not consider any massive, Obamacare-style legislation that no one understands.” He said the House is committed to a deliberate, “step-by-step approach.”¶ “Obviously, there is no appetite for one big bill,” Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart told a group of reporters Wednesday night. The Florida Republican, who had been a member of the unsuccessful bipartisan “gang of eight,” is working with other Republicans on a set of bills that would allow undocumented immigrants to “get right with the law.”¶ Diaz-Balart avoided using the word “legalization” because it has become so politically fraught.¶ Most recently, Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Florida, endorsed the House’s strategy. For a while, he had been behind an effort to pass comprehensive reform. Rubio was part of a bipartisan group in the Senate that wrote and helped move a comprehensive immigration reform bill through to final passage.¶ However, Rubio’s office now says he supports taking a piecemeal approach. Talking Points Memo reports:¶ The most prominent conservative supporter of sweeping immigration reform is calling on Congress to dial back the effort and instead focus on making incremental changes, delivering a significant blow to the prospects of reform. ¶ Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) now opposes a bicameral conference committee to reach a final resolution to the Senate-passed bill, his spokesman said, which anxious pro-reform advocates believe is the only feasible way to salvage the comprehensive overhaul.

#### Boehner Wont Introduce a Bill in the House

By Russell **Berman** - **10/29**/13 06:00 AM ET ObamaCare steals spotlight from push on immigration reformhttp://thehill.com/homenews/administration/331063-obamacare-steals-spotlight-from-push-on-immigration#ixzz2jIkSw3ML

Denham said he hopes other Republicans will announce their support in the coming days, which could give fresh momentum to the legislative push that is central to Obama’s second-term agenda.¶ Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) has yet to bring an immigration bill to the floor, and **there is no indication** he would do so in the five legislative weeks that remain on the House schedule in 2013. A bipartisan immigration group in the House collapsed in September when two Republicans left, citing a lack of trust in the Obama administration.¶ “We lost some time because of the shutdown,” said Randy Johnson, senior vice president at the Chamber of Commerce, which is participating in Tuesday’s “fly-in” lobbying visit.

**Obamacare Thumps the Disad**

By Russell **Berman** - **10/29**/13 06:00 AM ET ObamaCare steals spotlight from push on immigration reformhttp://thehill.com/homenews/administration/331063-obamacare-steals-spotlight-from-push-on-immigration#ixzz2jIkSw3ML

The troubled rollout of the healthcare law has **thrown a wrench** into President Obama’s push for immigration reform.¶ The White House and reform advocates in both parties have sought to refocus attention back to immigration following the 16-day government shutdown, but the problems plaguing the new federal insurance exchange website have **dominated** headlines.¶ The White House is getting a boost from a coalition of 600 faith, law enforcement and business leaders that plan to descend Tuesday on Capitol Hill to urge the House to take up immigration legislation before the end of the year.¶ “We’ve got to get Congress and the American public to focus on immigration because **we’ve got such a short time to get it on the floor**,” said Rep. Jeff Denham (Calif.), who over the weekend became the first Republican to sign on to a comprehensive immigration bill similar to the measure that passed the Senate in June.¶ Denham said he hopes other Republicans will announce their support in the coming days, which could give fresh momentum to the legislative push that is central to Obama’s second-term agenda.¶ Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) has yet to bring an immigration bill to the floor, and there is no indication he would do so in the five legislative weeks that remain on the House schedule in 2013. A bipartisan immigration group in the House collapsed in September when two Republicans left, citing a lack of trust in the Obama administration.¶ “We lost some time because of the shutdown,” said Randy Johnson, senior vice president at the Chamber of Commerce, which is participating in Tuesday’s “fly-in” lobbying visit. “There still is time on the House’s schedule to take up some immigration bills,” he said.¶ Yet **the administration’s attention** — and message — **is clearly divided**.¶ The White House has been inundated with questions about the buggy HealthCare.gov, the House has begun investigations, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has launched a daily press briefing to update the public on efforts to fix the website.¶ The setback is a familiar one for **immigration reform** advocates, who have seen the issue be upended by three separate crises in recent months: the debate over military intervention in Syria, the government shutdown and now the implementation of the healthcare law.¶ “It **is getting overshadowed**,” said Julian Zelizer, a political scientist at Princeton University. “It’s taking up time, and **it is consuming the president’s attention**,” he said of **the healthcare rollout.**

#### The money for the plan would be taken covertly

Michael E. Salla, PhD Center for Global Peace/School of International Service American University, Washington DC 11/23/2003[ The black budget report, http://www.slideshare.net/ProphecyFactory/the-blackbudgetreport-9017285]

Birth of the Black Budget In 1947, the National Security Act created the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Organization (CIA) and consolidated the US military into one entity, the Department of Defense (DoD). One of the issues that remained unresolved from the creation and operation of the CIA was the extent to which its budget and intelligence activities would remain a secret. According to Article 1, sec. 9, of the US Constitution, “No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time.” This constitutional requirement conflicted with the need for secrecy concerning Congressional appropriations for the CIA. The solution was for Congress to pass legislation approving the secrecy over the funding mechanisms used for the CIA and its intelligence related activities. The necessary bill was passed with great haste and minimal debate causing considerable concern among those few Congressmen brave enough to openly challenge the constitutionality of the Act. [3] Congressman Emmanuel Celler of New York voted for the bill but protested: “If the members of the Armed Services Committee can hear the detailed information to support this bill, why cannot the entire membership? Are they the Brahmins and we the untouchables? Secrecy is the answer.” [4] Celler, like the majority of Congressmen, passed the CIA Act very much like the wealthy father viewed the birth of an illegitimate child, appropriate care would be taken to provide for the child, but there would be no official admission of patrimony and the responsibility that entails. The 1949 CIA Act comprised additions to those sections of the 1947 National Security Act that dealt with the creation of CIA. The 1949 CIA Act gave a Congressional stamp of approval to the creation of a ‘black budget’ as the following sections make clear: … any other Government agency is authorized to transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums without regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers between appropriations [emphasis added]. Sums transferred to the Agency in accordance with this paragraph may be expended for the purposes and under the authority of sections 403a to 403s of this title without regard to limitations of appropriations from which transferred. [5] This section meant that funds could be transferred from the appropriations of other government departments earmarked for specific tasks, “without regard to any provisions of law”. For example, a Congressional appropriation earmarked for housing subsidies to low-income workers by Housing and Urban Development (HUD), could be legally transferred either to the CIA for covert intelligence activities or through the CIA to a DoD associated intelligence agency for a classified program. Thus HUD employees might find that their relevant housing programs were lacking the necessary funds for relief efforts even though Congress had appropriated these funds for this purpose. Any HUD official unfortunate enough as to enquire into the location of the missing funds would be deterred from pursuing the issue, and if these officials persisted, they could be summarily dismissed, and then exposed to a variety of CIA activities to silence them. [6] Despite its legal authority to transfer funds from other federal agencies regardless of what their Congressional appropriations were for, the conventional wisdom was that the major source of appropriations for the CIA came through the DoD. This is apparently what President Truman had in mind when he approved that the "operating funds for the organization [CIA] would be obtained from the Departments of State, War, and Navy instead of directly from Congress." [7] This funding arrangement ostensibly assured that the CIA would be subordinate to the Secretaries of Defense and State who would be in a better position to influence its covert activities. Four years after passage of the 1949 CIA Act, the following categories and sums in the relevant defense force appropriations apparently provided the bulk of the black budget funding of the CIA.

#### Security innovation is spun by the Pentagon to conceal controversial portions in Congress

Burghardt 4/4/11 – researcher and activist based in the San Francisco Bay Area, his articles are published in many venues. He is the editor of Police State America: U.S. Military "Civil Disturbance" Planning, distributed by AK Press (“With Obama and Congress Poised to Gut Social Spending, Pentagon Demands Billions in ‘Cybersecurity’ Handouts”, Dissident Voice, http://dissidentvoice.org/2011/04/with-obama-and-congress-poised-to-gut-social-spending-pentagon-demands-billions-in-cybersecurity-handouts/)//javi

For their part, the “Army and Defense Information Systems Agency referred inquiries about their proposed cyber spending to department-level officials.” And “Navy officials said they could not provide a top-line budget figure, since funding that supports Navy cybersecurity activities is scattered across several line items, as well as multiple programs, organizations and commands.” As Sternstein points out, while “the area surrounding ‘cybersecurity’ funding is gray … the various interpretations of cybersecurity spending translate into real-world financial and national security costs, budget and technology.” Defense Department spokeswoman April Cunningham told NextGov, that the Air Force “included things that we, [at the department's office of the chief information officer] categorize as IT infrastructure, or other activities–not directly information assurance.” “According to the department,” Sternstein writes, “information assurance consists of five programs, including public key infrastructure, or digital certificates, as well as defense industrial base cybersecurity for private sector assets that support the military.” Cunningham said that “activities at the Air Force and other services that Defense considers to be ‘information assurance-cybersecurity’ are captured in the total $3.2 billion figure.” And “based on this formula” the Army is seeking $432 million and the Navy are lusting after $347 million in FY2012. However, other Defense agencies “including DISA, the National Security Agency and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency–are asking for a cumulative $1.6 billion. Details on proposed cyber spending at all Pentagon components are shared with Congress in a classified budget book, she said.” Which means, given the Pentagon’s propensity to quietly hide their most controversial programs within the dark folds of the black budget, Congress, let alone the American people, really have no idea what such programs entail, who benefits from black contract outlays and ultimately, how they’ll be deployed. NextGov reported that the revised budget request “also includes funding for noninformation assurance activities” that the Pentagon claims “are integral to the military’s cyber posture, specifically cyber operations, security innovations and forensics.”

#### Visas fail to get independent tech start-ups

Helper 13

[Lauren, Economic Development Reporter, “H1-B: A Work Visa that Puts Life in Limbo,” Silicon Valley Business Journal, 1/18, http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2013/01/17/h1-b-a-work-visa-that-puts-life-in.html?page=all]

For immigrants, the H-1B visa represents a thread of hope that can entangle the most ambitious entrepreneurs.¶ Current H-1B policies can both stifle startups and force immigrants to seek sponsorship from big, established companies when they’d rather be pursuing the next great idea at their own company.¶ In 2008 alone, 404,907 foreign nationals applied for H-1B visas. Only 129,464 people got them. There is annual cap of 65,000 H-1B visas, plus 20,000 more for foreign nationals with advanced U.S. degrees. Universities and associated nonprofits are exempt from this cap.¶ Those numbers spelled difficulty for New Delhi native Prayag Narula. Narula, 28, co-founded the startup MobileWorks, an online business that connects people seeking intermittent labor with jobs that pay a living wage.¶ Focus on immigration¶ Borrowed time: Immigrant entrepreneurs step out of the shadows¶ H1-B: A work visa that puts life in limbo¶ For foreign talent, a high-seas haven¶ Immigration tab: 3 months, $10K, many headaches¶ After graduation from U.C. Berkeley in 2012, Narula was hoping his MobileWorks project would qualify him for an H-1B employer visa — one of the most common, and widely-panned, employment visas — to stay in the country and keep growing the startup.¶ But Narula’s lawyers encouraged him to apply for a more temporary Optional Practical Training program for former U.S. students, since visa evaluators often view startups with skepticism. He’s currently working while in the OPT program.¶ The bar for workers seeking H-1B visas is high: Companies must prove that employees can be paid prevailing industry salaries (a dicey proposition at many startups). Narula said his attorneys recommended that he document at least $500,000 in company funding, which MobileWorks didn’t have at the time.¶ MobileWorks’ difficulties securing an H-1B for Narula is particularly telling, given its profile.¶ The company, which participated in the Y Combinator startup incubator in 2011, was singled out by Forbes on the publication’s 30 Under 30 list for social entrepreneurs in 2012.¶ “It’s really frustrating,” Narula said. “We have employed people all over the world. We employ hundreds of thousands of Americans.”¶ For now, he has one year on his OPT visa, plus a possible 15-month extension, before he has to arrange new documentation.¶ His experience navigating the murky H-1B visa system is a variation on a common theme

## 1ar

### 1ar – cp

**Resolved:**

5. To express, as an opinion or determination, by resolution and vote; to declare or decide by a formal vote; -- followed by a clause; as, the house resolved (or, it was resolved by the house) that no money should be apropriated (or, to appropriate no money).

**Should expresses desirability**

**Cambridge Dictionary of American English 07** ([http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=should\*1+0&dict=A](http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=should*1+0&dict=A))

**should** (DUTY)

auxiliary verb

used to express that it is necessary, desirable, advisable, or important to perform the action of the following verb

#### Environmental collapse doesn’t cause extinction – tech solves

**Science Daily 10**

Science Daily, reprinted from materials provided by American Institute of Biological Sciences, September 1, 2010, "Human Well-Being Is Improving Even as Ecosystem Services Decline: Why?", http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/09/100901072908.htm

Global degradation of ecosystems is widely believed to threaten human welfare, yet accepted measures of well-being show that it is on average improving globally, both in poor countries and rich ones. A team of authors writing in the September issue of BioScience dissects explanations for this "environmentalist's paradox." Noting that understanding the paradox is "critical to guiding future management of ecosystem services," Ciara Raudsepp-Hearne and her colleagues confirm that improvements in aggregate well-being are real, despite convincing evidence of ecosystem decline. Three likely reasons they identify -- past increases in food production, technological innovations that decouple people from ecosystems, and time lags before well-being is affected -- provide few grounds for complacency, however. Raudsepp-Hearne and her coauthors accept the findings of the influential Millennium Ecosystem Assessment that the capacity of ecosystems to produce many services for humans is now low. Yet they uncover no fault with the composite Human Development Index, a widely used metric that incorporates measures of literacy, life expectancy, and income, and has improved markedly since the mid-1970s. Although some measures of personal security buck the upward trend, the overall improvement in well-being seems robust. The researchers resolve the paradox partly by pointing to evidence that food production (which has increased globally over past decades) is more important for human well-being than are other ecosystem services. They also establish support for two other explanations: that technology and innovation have decoupled human well-being from ecosystem degradation, and that there is a time lag after ecosystem service degradation before human well-being will be affected.

### 1ar – security

#### Data goes aff

**Eijkman 12 (**The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims\_in\_authentic\_learning\_report.pdf. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal)

¶ This is where simulations have come into their own. The operative word is ‘have’, as there is a substantive record of success, which will be shown below. The point is that simulations have demonstrated the capacity either singularly, or in combination with other learning methods, for dealing effectively with the learning demands posed by public policy development; and this is not just at post-graduate level in universities, but at the highest echelons of American military leaders and policymakers (see for example Brewer, 1984; Beriker & Druckman, 1996; Babus, Hodges & Kjonnerod, 1997; Andreozzi, 2002McCown, 2005 and attached reading list in Annexure 2.10). Policy development simulations are effective in meeting the learning needs of both early career and highly experienced practitioners. Simulations help them to deal more proficiently with a complex mix of highly adaptive, interdependent, and interactive socio-technical, political, and economic systems; their often uncertain systemic reactions; and their unpredictable unexpected and undesired effects (Glouberman & Zimmerman, 2002; Jacobsen, & Wilensky, 2006; Bekebrede, 2010; van Bilsen, Bekerede & Mayer, 2010)